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ABSTRACT 
The collapse of traditional epistemology, which began in the eighteen hundreds in 
Europe, has removed many of the traditional distinctions between philosophy and rhetoric 
and has significantly expanded the scope of the latter. This dissertation explores aspects of 
the new definition of rhetoric that emerges from this collapse. The new definition 
emphasizes how we form ideas (decisions, judgments, theories, but also names and images) 
by communicating as we work together to solve problems and to decide courses of action by 
examining social/cultural, institutional, and individual values. "How Professionals Form 
Their Ideas: An Urgent Research Direction for Rhetoric and Professional Communication" 
argues that the shift in the definition of rhetoric invites the discipline of professional 
communication to study how professionals arrive at their ideas, instead of how professionals 
communicate once they have formed their ideas. Noting the growing influence of 
professionals and the shrinking public sphere, the paper argues that this research direction 
should be prioritized. "Limits of Countering Stereotypes Through the Use of Visual 
Rhetoric: A Study of Photographs of Iran" studies how stereotypes—a specific type of 
idea—are formed and explores ways of countering the effects and processes of stereotyping 
in ways that do not merely attempt to reverse those effects and processes. "Revisiting the 
Poststructural ist Turn in Critical Pedagogy" argues that the poststructuralist inflections of 
critical pedagogy have introduced elements of objectivism into critical pedagogy, which 
despite its roots in nineteenth century philosophy is much more in keeping with the shift in 
the definition of rhetoric than what poststructuralism has to offer. 
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CHAPTER 1. DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
This dissertation consists of three articles that are being prepared for publication. In 
addition to presenting an outline of the three articles, this introduction offers an explanation 
of (a) what topics I am studying and in what ways they are linked, (b) why I am studying 
those topics, and (c) what theorists have helped me frame and direct my studies. 
What connects the three articles in this dissertation and what constitutes the heart of 
my scholarly interests are issues of justice and freedom. But of course those issues are 
closely connected to how ideas are formed and how the quality of this formation can be 
improved. For example, to be able to say that a given condition in which certain people find 
themselves is oppressive requires knowledge of a wide range of other issues related to how 
ideas are formed: How do I arrive at my judgment? What standards and norms do I use for 
my judgment? How do I arrive at my norms and standards? How did that condition come 
about? How do the creators of that condition explain it? Do the people I consider oppressed 
agree with my judgment? If they do not, is it possible (or under what conditions is it 
possible) to say the oppressed are systematically mistaken about their condition? The same 
question can also be asked of members of some oppressive government who refuse to 
acknowledge that they are oppressing a group of people. And how do people who hold 
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grudges against one another (say, the oppressed and the oppressor) ever resolve their 
differences? Through what type of communication? For me these questions are not mere 
intellectual puzzles. I lived through the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, and I have first-hand 
knowledge of the atrocities that can be committed when social arrangements and activities 
and thinking habits of people are not conducive to the formation of moderately good ideas. 
In the academy, my first extended and methodical attempt to understand how ideas 
are formed was in the context of writing my M.A. thesis, where I examined several rhetoric 
textbooks and argued that our most widely used model of critical thinking and rhetoric taught 
in first-year composition classes remains completely vulnerable to the intrusion of gross 
forms of prejudice. I called that model the institutional definition of critical thinking (IDCT). 
I argued that IDCT, at best, teaches what philosophers call instrumental rationality, which 
concerns itself with finding the best means of arriving at predetermined ends. I examined 
some of the most salient characteristics and implications of IDCT. Using critiques of two 
important feminist epistemologists (Sandra Harding and Elisabeth Lloyd), I noted that IDCT 
excludes the possibility of the rational consideration of what traditional philosophy calls 
"values" and has strong suspicions of the place and function of emotions in thinking. I traced 
the historical roots of instrumental rationality and its closely related concept of objectivism to 
ancient Greece and in particular to Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysical and epistemological 
project (henceforth master tradition), a project that over the centuries, but especially since 
the middle of the nineteenth century, has collapsed. Since all articles in this dissertation 
wrestle—one way or another—with the implications of the collapse of the master tradition, in 
the following subsection, I will outline my key findings about that framework. 
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The Master Tradition and Its Influence 
Plato and Aristotle stand out in the history of thought because of their tremendous 
influence on subsequent thinkers. In this subsection, I will explain some of the implications 
of the master tradition for knowledge and oppression. When discussing the master tradition, I 
will focus on the Aristotelian version for two reasons. First, Renaissance and Enlightenment, 
out of which modern philosophy developed, came out of an Aristotelian version of the master 
tradition (Marias, 167). And, second, Aristotle as the founder of the science of logic (see for 
example Marias, 74) provided not only theoretical justifications for his epistemology but also 
a widely used methodology that contributed greatly to the adoption of his ideas. 
I began my studies by asking Aristotle, this founder of the science of logic, to explain 
his justifications for his frank endorsement of various forms of oppression. In Politics, 
Aristotle writes, 
Tame animals are by nature better than wild, and it is better for them 
all to be ruled by men, because it secures their safety. Again, as 
between male and female the former is by nature superior and ruler, 
the latter inferior and subject. And this must hold good of mankind in 
general. (68) 
What Aristotle means by "nature" is part of his general description of the nature of 
the world and reality and is a very complex concept because this nature has something to do 
with rationality itself (Charles, 54). He believed that everything in the world consists of an 
elaborate hierarchy of matter and form (or essence). At one end of the hierarchy is prime 
matter (O'Conner, 50), which is indefinite and "entirely featureless and structureless." Unlike 
Plato, Aristotle thought both form (essence or idea) and matter are real and together they 
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constitute the substance of a thing. Aristotle considered the relationship between form and 
matter also in terms of processes to account for change (O'Connor, 51). As processes, matter 
has the potential to be actualized or formed as the acorn has the potential to actualize into an 
oak. Potentiality is a purpose built into all matter. The world is slowly forming and 
becoming what it is designed for. The main process by which matter is formed is the final 
cause. For example, the final cause of a house would be its purpose, providing shelter and 
comfort. This concept in turn leads to the concept of god, which is all form and the form, 
purpose, and cause (final) of the world. 
When it comes to living beings, the concepts of matter and form become body and 
soul. By soul Aristotle means the body's "nature, organization, and manner of working" 
(O'Connor, 52). Different living beings have different types of souls on a hierarchical 
ladder: plant souls have nutritive and reproductive abilities (faculties); animal souls have in 
addition sensitive (tactile), "instinctive desire," and locomotive abilities; humans have in 
addition a rational ability (52). In the human soul there is, as well, a hierarchy of form and 
matter: the vegetative, emotional, and rational faculties, the rational part being what he 
called the mind. 
Contrary to what one might expect, Aristotle's epistemology does not underpin his 
metaphysical claims about the world; rather it is the other way round: his metaphysics 
underpins his epistemology (Charles, 55). For Aristotle, knowledge is not a product of 
mental activity along the lines of, say, representation of what is real out there in the world. 
Aristotle believed form and matter were both real; and he believed that matter, which is a 
changing potentiality (incomplete and indefinite) cannot be comprehended (Dewey, 85). So 
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what can be known is the form or essence, which is delimited, at rest, and unmixed with 
other things. 
His system allowed for two main ways of knowing: indirectly through definitions or 
directly through intuitive grasp (51, O'Conner; Book 1,31, Open Society). Scientific 
demonstration aims to describe or define the essence through a process of reasoning Aristotle 
called syllogism (Popper, Book 1,31); but, technically, knowledge itself is an intellectual 
intuition (grasp) of essences. Ultimately, knowledge for Aristotle is intuition since both the 
starting point of the chain of reasoning in syllogisms (Woozley, 452) and the conclusions of 
demonstrations (definitions) are grasped intuitively (Dewey, 88). 
Aristotle's epistemology and metaphysics provide a comprehensive early formulation 
of objectivism since there is no point in separating causality in the world from rationality of 
minds. Mind is the faculty of the soul that is in touch with or intuits the essences of things. 
Causality and rationality, cause and reason, coincide. 
To appreciate Aristotle's justifications for oppression, and the complexity of the task 
facing, for example, feminist philosophers in trying to formulate alternative philosophies of 
knowledge and justice, several important characteristics of his philosophy should be 
highlighted. 
For Aristotle, form is "better" (Russell, 176) than matter because as Louis Ropes 
Loomis in Aristotle On Man in the Universe writes, "form in nature is what gives pattern and 
character to everything" (xxiii). And the world is on a hierarchy or evolutionary ladder of 
form and matter. The attribution of value or purpose to nature has two important 
implications. First, it explained the "intelligibility of nature and the possibility of science," 
and, second, it "gave sanction and worth to the moral and religious endeavors of man" 
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(Dewey, Influence, 309). In other words, what is truly good is determined by nature, the 
order and structure of the world, not what people merely think is good. 
The relationship between form and matter is also one of rule and domination. 
Aristotle writes, "In all cases where there is a compound ... a ruling element and a ruled can 
always be traced. This characteristic ... is present in animate beings by virtue of the whole 
constitution of nature, inanimate as well as animate" (Barker's Politics 12). Since substance 
is a compound of form and matter, Aristotle is covering all of reality (except prime matter 
and God). Examples of ruler/ruled relationships Aristotle gives in his works are man/woman, 
soul/body, mind/soul, man/animal, Greek/barbarian, and father/child (see also Saunders, 66). 
The idea of the rule of form implies that matter resists form. Thus not only the good ends 
towards which reality strives but also instances of decay can be explained. For example, 
according to Aristotle, the difference between a boy and a man is that "A boy is like a 
woman in form" and "the woman is as it were an impotent male, for it is through a certain 
incapacity that the female is female" (268, Metaphysics, in Ross's translation). 
Aristotle's characterization of slavery can be summarized as follows. The principle 
of "rule and subordination in nature at large" (Barker, 11) can be seen in the relationship 
between soul and the body and between the mind and the soul. In all cases, the part that is 
more formed (13) should rule. The same principle justifies the natural master to rule the 
natural slave (11). The principle is strict, for, as Aristotle says, people are "marked, 
immediately at birth" to rule or to be ruled, and this state of affairs is both "necessary" and 
"expedient" (12, Barker's translation). According to Aristotle, the slave and the master have 
to be slave and master by nature. And what makes a person a natural master is—of all 
things—rationality because the natural master "possesses the rational faculty of the soul" 
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(Barker, 11). What goes for masters and slaves also goes for men and women: "The slave is 
entirely without the faculty of deliberation; the female indeed possesses it, but in a form 
which remains inconclusive" (35). A rational person grasps (intuits) the actual nature of the 
world, which is the hierarchical rule of form over matter, and reason is able to explain why 
this domination occurs, why it is good. 
Current Research Directions 
One of the many issues I discovered by studying Aristotle was that contemporary 
attempts to use Aristotle's rhetoric should be made with great caution because for Aristotle 
rhetoric is not designed to teach a theory about discovering socially mediated, reliable 
knowledge: that goal is not part of rhetoric's problematics. On Rhetoric was written for 
students and readers who were expected to have understood many other subjects explained 
elsewhere in his works, since in On Rhetoric issues of justice, reasoning, women, slavery, the 
demos, democracies, etc. are all in the background. Several of his key works are actually 
named in the text; there are frequent references to concepts, definitions, and discussions 
elaborated in other works; and—even without such references—those concepts are embedded 
in the theoretical definitions and divisions of rhetoric (e.g., emotional appeals are directed to 
the emotional faculty of the soul). Thus when Aristotle writes, "rhetoric is an offshoot" (154, 
translated by W. Rhys Roberts in The Rhetorical Tradition) of ethical and political studies, 
this does not mean that rhetoric is a tool for understanding ethical and political subjects. 
Rather it is designed to teach his students knowledge for solving a very specific problem: 
how to deal with the "ordinary people" in public places of Athens (Brunschwig, 51), whom 
8 
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics complains of being impervious to argument because of their 
penchant for living "by their feelings" (1179b 9-18, Terence Irwin's translation). 
Towards the end of my thesis research, I also realized that the assumptions and 
justifications of the master tradition have completely unraveled since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. That unraveling has had far-reaching consequences for how knowledge 
production and communication can be theorized because the master tradition was a lived 
theoretical framework. In other words, many of its arguments, being deeply embedded in the 
assumptions of Western societies, are invisible. And I realized that the task of contemporary 
philosophers and rhetoricians is much greater than at least most rhetoricians I have studied in 
my doctoral program seem to appreciate. The collapse of the master tradition opens 
unnervingly vast vistas, many of which lead to little-traveled paths. For example, the 
collapse results in the erosion of the traditional distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, a 
distinction that seems to worsen an already sharp distinction between the premises of social 
constructionism and the idea of rationality. And a great deal of definitional work has to go 
into what exactly rhetoric means if the master tradition is rejected, since the definitions that 
categorized rhetoric (often in relation to philosophy) assume the master tradition as their 
frame of reference. What scholars of communication and idea formation face is nothing less 
than trying to take in the full scope of the ruined edifice of the master tradition (and its 
Aristotelian theology) and to see if we can clear our minds of it in order to have a chance at 
re-envisioning the whole field of human communication and reasoning. 
Since communication and formation of ideas (decisions, judgments, etc.) bear directly 
on questions of justice and oppression, I have been particularly interested in 
reconceptualizing rhetoric, especially as it relates to justice, while avoiding positivism and 
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extreme versions of social constructionism. Of particular concern to me is the reduction of 
questions regarding justice to opinion and power. That reduction dramatically affects our 
conceptions of rhetoric, pedagogy, research, ethics, and politics. So I have been examining 
the historical and conceptual frameworks producing that reduction. 
I have looked for alternative perspectives on rhetoric that go beyond its traditional 
topics (audience, context, purpose, logos, ethos, pathos, etc.) to include wider fields such as 
how we come up with the standards (values) for accepting or rejecting ideas, how we are 
socialized (that is, implicitly, through ideology or hegemony) or educated (that is, explicitly, 
through formal instruction) to accept certain ideas, how we understand and categorize our 
qualitative states (affects, feelings, desires, emotions, sensations, passions, sentiments, 
drives, impulses, etc.). And I have been exploring models of communication that do not 
arbitrarily focus on one small aspect (e.g., advocacy) or one type (e.g., extreme top-down 
communication such as that between teacher and student in some traditional classrooms, 
preacher and congregation, administrator and administrated, and commercial broadcaster and 
TV-viewer). I have looked at, and would like to study more, models like committees and 
meetings, in which people supposedly at the receiving end of communication are not 
completely passive or absent. Other models are communication in assemblies (e.g., 
Congress, city-hall meetings), courtroom communication (the area of interest for Perelman 
and Toulmin), scientific communication (Latour), and, I would argue, professional 
communication among professionals. 
In pursuit of alternative perspectives on rhetoric, I have focused on texts in 
philosophy because much of the debate about sociology of knowledge, of which social 
constructionism in rhetoric is a specialized current, has been taking place outside 
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professional communication. To answer the most basic questions about the presence of 
injustice in a social context requires an examination of a wide array of issues including social 
constructionist ones (Are people's ideas completely determined by their social condition? 
Can people be systematically deluded about the justice or injustice of their situation?). 
Moreover, since one of the implications of the erosion of the rhetoric/philosophy distinction 
expands the scope of rhetoric's concerns to include idea formation, studying traditional 
philosophy becomes necessary since idea formation has been a concern of traditional 
philosophy. More specifically, what traditional philosophy calls value judgments becomes 
important; thus insights from ethics, politics, and aesthetics become relevant to the expanded 
field of rhetoric. 
As the articles in this dissertation argue in different contexts, the collapse of the 
master tradition expands the field of rhetoric to recognizes that knowledge is produced (1) 
communally and through communication in the context of collaborative activity, (2) through 
a process of searching (inquiry), which at every step involves value judgments, and (3) 
through critical interpretations by agents at several levels: culture-wide values of society, 
institutional values, and values of agents/subjects. A great deal of work has been done on 
these issues by a wide range of theorists. But the alternative perspectives I am interested in 
also try to address the issue of how judgments of value are in fact formed (interpretation of 
signs in hermeneutics, theory choice in science) within different discourse communities. This 
interest requires close examination of a set of related issues: what organizational structures, 
approaches to inquiry, activity procedures, etc. lend themselves to the formation of optimal 
ideas that achieve/transform the aims of the community while representing good policies for 
the agent and the broader public. These issues are pivotal to professional communication 
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since professionals justify their value to society by claiming possession of specialized bodies 
of knowledge. Since this possession is a defining characteristic of professionals, I am 
interested in critically scrutinizing their work in the same way that sociologists of knowledge 
have scrutinized the work of engineers and scientists. 
Compared with the traditional framework of rhetoric, the alternative perspectives I 
am interested in are new and riddled with problems and complexities that need to be 
explored. The articles in the dissertation explore various aspects of those complexities. For 
example, in one article I take seriously the claim of sociology of knowledge (and of rhetoric 
of inquiry) that knowledge is produced communally but argue further that rhetoricians should 
also consider the work of professionals as involving knowledge production through 
communication and should explore the conditions that are conducive to the formation of 
good ideas in professions. In another article, I attempt to examine and argue against some of 
what I consider to be unwarranted conclusions that certain theorists attribute to sociology of 
knowledge. In particular some versions of poststructuralism seem to subscribe to the very . 
objectivist assumptions they aim to refute. They assume objective knowledge to be certain 
and a-perspectival, and because they find such knowledge to be impossible, they announce 
that objective knowledge cannot be obtained. These claims, of course, also do away with the 
reliability of any claims made by the oppressed regarding the objectivity (reality) of their 
suffering. 
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Review of Significant Literature 
According to the framework emerging from the gradual shift in the western 
intellectual tradition, knowledge and language are accompaniments and products of activity. 
In the tradition of analytic philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes that "the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (1107). In that of continental philosophy, 
Friedrich Nietzsche argues somewhat dramatically for a philosophy of life in which "truth 
[is] the illusion that helps us cope with life" (Safranski, 349). Karl Marx's notion of praxis— 
"what else is life but activity" (315)—has perhaps been the best known example of this shift. 
According to this view, knowledge is not merely passive contemplation/interpretation of 
reality but is produced through interaction with (and transformation of) reality. Later views 
reflecting this shift can be seen in the works of American pragmatists, and more recently in 
continental philosophy in that of Martin Heidegger, for whom certain types of knowledge of 
things for humans already in the world comes from the use of those things in activities (99). 
These views have been expounded more recently in Foucault's writings on discursive 
practices and Habermas's on communicative action, and in Bourdieu's theories of practical 
reason and action, John Searle's expansion of speech act theory to rationality in action, and 
the work of feminist philosophers of science such as Helen Longino, Sandra Harding, and 
Donna Haraway. 
All along I have been interested in understanding the implications of these alternative 
models for research, pedagogy, and politics. Thus my papers touch on or explicitly explore 
the points of contact between this emerging view in philosophy and professional 
communication, critical pedagogy, and visual rhetoric. Because the emerging models 
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emphasize the social character of knowledge production, I have been interested in examining 
social arrangements that help or hinder the formation of good ideas. For example, some of 
the most important decisions in countries like the United States are made by professionals, 
and I am interested in examining social arrangements designed to channel or to facilitate 
collective decisions making. 
Below is a guide to the topics and thinkers whose works either frame my arguments 
or are scrutinized in the dissertation. I organize this review according to the three 
characteristics of the alternative perspectives (see above) that I am exploring: 
• Knowledge is produced communally and through communication in the context of 
collaborative activity: 
• (Neo)-pragmatism (Peirce, Dewey, Rorty, Hernstein Smith), activity theory 
(Vygotsky), hermeneutics of Heidegger, language games of Wittgenstein, 
speech act theory of Searle, and Habermass's theory of communicative action; 
• Sociology of knowledge (theories of knowledge, social constructionism, 
rhetoric of inquiry) including texts of/on classical and cultural marxism (in 
various manifestations, for example, poststructuralism); 
• Dialogue and conversation (Rorty, Bakhtin, Vygotsky, Mendelson); and 
• History and theory of rhetoric. 
• Knowledge is produced through a process of searching (inquiry), which at every step 
involves value judgments: 
• Philosophy of (social) science (Fay, Coser, Trigg, readings in philosophy of 
science) including theories of knowledge (Aristotle, feminist epistemologies, 
cultural studies articulation theory); 
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• Research methodologies of social sciences (especially qualitative research); 
• Pragmatism (Dewey and Booth), Isocratic and Protagorean philosophies (in 
general, Sophistic philosophies, Consigny and Mendelson); 
• Theories of ethics, politics, and aesthetics; and 
• Rationality and value judgments (the question of truth, philosophical 
hermeneutics, and theory choice) including discussions of the fact/value 
dichotomy. 
• Knowledge is produced through critical interpretations by agents at several levels: 
• Embedded culture-wide pre-conceptions as the common ground of activity 
(propaganda and socialization). Questions of 
• Ideology (hegemony) in Marxism, feminism, and postcolonial and 
cultural studies, 
• Tradition in hermeneutics, 
• Background in speech act theory, and 
• Conceptual schemes in cognitive psychology; 
• Institutional (discourse/disciplinary/professional community) values 
(Nietzsche, Foucault, texts on sociology of knowledge and social 
constructionism, language and signifying practices in anthropology and 
qualitative research, and rhetoric of inquiry, discussions of professional 
communication and professionalism); and 
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• Interaction of the subjects/identities with institutional and culture-wide values 
(critical theory and pedagogy, multiculturalism, cultural studies, 
autocritography, student-curriculum debates) including discussions/definitions 
of the subject and of identity (feminism, cultural studies, Marxism, etc.). 
Article Outlines 
Article 1—Professional Communication and Idea Formation 
In "How Professionals Form Their Ideas: An Urgent Research Direction for Rhetoric 
and Professional Communication," I argue that a major line of inquiry in rhetoric and 
professional communication should be how ideas are formed in professions. The paper has 
five parts. First, to formulate a clear definition of professions, I examine a recent article in 
the Journal of Business and Technical Communication which concerns itself with a historical 
survey of the definitions of professionalism and professional communication in the journals 
of our discipline. Second, I argue that the Aristotelian conceptualization of rhetoric as what 
Perelman calls "advocacy" or persuasive communication of already formed ideas is no longer 
tenable because Aristotle's extra-rhetorical methodology for arriving at knowledge has been 
discredited. Rather, the new conceptualization of rhetoric recognizes that knowledge is 
arrived at through communicative social interaction in the process of communal activity. In 
the new conceptualization, discovery and invention are foregrounded. Thus, as a discipline, 
rhetoric should be attentive to how ideas are formed in a given context. And as pedagogy it 
should aim to do what Isocrates held up as the goal of his educational philosophy: teaching 
students how to examine the context in order to arrive at sound judgments and to give good 
16 
advice. Third, I explain what I mean by studying idea formation in professional 
communication and why I think it is important that this line of inquiry be taken up with more 
diligence in RFC. Fourth, I offer an informal example of a professional environment I once 
worked in to indicate what kind of questions the type of inquiry I propose would give rise to. 
Finally, I offer a list of professional settings in which this type of inquiry can be conducted. 
In this article, my concern is to show that professions justify their special privileges 
and powers in society by monopolizing certain types of knowledge; they are handlers and 
creators of knowledge (what counts as good ideas). In fact, what they do is similar to what 
scientists do. For the same reasons that knowledge production in the community of scientists 
and engineers has been scrutinized by rhetoricians of inquiry and sociologists of knowledge 
(including feminists), professional communication scholars should study not just how 
professionals communicate their already formed ideas for lay audiences but how they form 
their ideas in general. I also argue that this research direction has important consequences for 
our understanding of the possibility of democracy for a society in which the public sphere 
rapidly is being ceded to experts and professionals. 
This article will be submitted to POROl, a peer-reviewed, on-line journal. 
Article 2: Visual Rhetoric and Stereotypes 
In "Limits of Countering Stereotypes Through the Use of Visual Rhetoric: A Study 
of Photographs of Iran," I explore the scope for countering stereotypes by the use of photos 
and other still images. The dangers of the post-9/11 world prompted me to consider my 
options for trying to counter stereotypes of Iranians. It seems less likely now that Iran may 
be invaded by the United States. But in 2002, the likelihood seemed great. And my family 
and I observed with growing concern the dehumanizing stereotypes of Middle Easterners, 
Arabs, and Iranians increasingly used by the media and political leaders. Around that time, I 
accepted to speak publicly about Iran. And I began preparing a one-hour computer 
presentation for that purpose. In the presentation, I decided to use many photographs and 
maps to make the presentation visually more intensive. But as time progressed, I became 
more and more concerned about certain ethical considerations involved in making such a 
presentation, especially about the use of photographs. In fall of 2003,1 presented 
"Representing Iran: The Pitfalls of Countering Stereotypes Through Image and Word" at 
The Power and Persistence of Stereotyping Conference held at Universidade de Aveiro, 
Portugal. At the conference, I became acquainted with fascinating explorations of the 
concept of "stereotype," explorations that added to my understanding of the complexities 
involved in countering stereotypes. My article is in part based on my presentation in 
Portugal and what I learned there. The article uses some of Plato's ideas to explore the 
complexities I encountered when I was working on my presentation. Over time, I have come 
to appreciate the difference between Plato's playful handling of ideas (or his focus on the 
practice of philosophy) and various forms of Platonisms. In some interpretations of Plato, 
Plato's dialogues show him to be struggling to formulate and to resolve various problems. 
Usually he is not entirely successful, but he proposes various solutions and explores them. 
Unfortunately, often those tentative solutions have been adopted and presented as rigid 
doctrines by later thinkers. Although I still think much of what Karl Popper says about 
strong undercurrents of authoritarian thought present in the dialogues to be Plato's, Plato, 
now it seems to me, has the redeeming quality of struggling with those thought patterns, 
something that many of his Platonist followers lacked. At any rate, I have come to consider 
the possibility that Plato did have a core set of legitimate concerns about the difference 
between what seems to be true and what is true. Of course, my acceptance of Plato's 
identification of the problems of deception in discourse and of mistakes in inquiry do not 
commit me to his tentative yet rather grand solutions: his postulating the existence of the real 
world of ideas as opposed to the phenomenal world of the senses, the tripartite nature of the 
soul, and all the rest of it. But seeing Plato as someone who was not as concerned with the 
doctrines that he examined as he was with enacting and living philosophy offers important 
insights. In this re-interpretation of Plato, it turns out that it was through the practice of 
philosophy that, he believed, he could get a glimpse of knowledge. In this context, there is 
an interesting parallel between what he says about painting and what he says about 
philosophizing. In some passages in his works, Plato seems to be saying that a painter who 
paints, say, a rein does not really know it. Only riders know what reins are because they use 
reins in their activities and handle and see them in relation to other things. For Plato, his 
ideas (thoughts) are like the reins; he has to use them, connect them with other ideas, test 
them in dialogues, as well as live them physically or vicariously, again, through dialogues to 
see if they stretch or break or can be used; that in other words, is how he knows. I argue in 
my essay that a flexible handling of this insight can help highlight certain problems 
associated with idea formation in general and visual representations with photographs in 
particular. What does it mean to accompany a news report of Iran's nuclear activities with a 
photograph of the inside of a nuclear power plant? Or when a report of a demonstration of 
women in Iran is accompanied by a photograph of a woman wearing the hejabl The essay 
argues that perhaps the only effective role static visual representations can have in countering 
stereotypes is disruption. They can have a destructive, not a constructive role, in countering 
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stereotypes. To use a Platonic framework, visuals can be used like Socratic elenchos aimed 
at dislodging the prejudgments of the conversation partner. The goal of the elenchos would 
not be to arrive at knowledge, but at an aporia, a crisis, and perhaps some advice about 
possible paths to further inquiry. 
This article has been accepted for publication in Writing the Visual: A Practical 
Guide for Teachers of Rhetoric and Composition, an anthology for Parlor Press's series on 
visual rhetoric (Marguerite Helmers, general editor). 
Article 3—Poststructuralism and Critical Pedagogy 
In "Revisiting the Poststructuralist Turn in Critical Pedagogy," I argue that (a) lack of 
appreciation for the concept of praxis in critical pedagogy and (b) underlying objectivist 
tendencies in certain articulations of poststructuralism have tended to undermine the very 
motivating impulse behind critical pedagogy in composition studies. In this essay I first look 
at formulations of the project of critical pedagogy by Paulo Freire and Ira Shor and then 
show how those early formulations have been inflected by the poststructuralist turn in 
composition studies. I will argue—whatever the problems of the original formulations of 
critical pedagogy—that the poststructuralist inflections have had the disastrous consequence 
of eroding the meanings of terms such as oppression, liberation, and justice. To understand 
the sources of this erosion (and whether there is any justification for it), I look at some 
manifestations of a loose collection of ideas that is often referred to as postmodernism. I 
outline some of the relevant articulations of this collection of ideas. Then I examine and at 
some length respond to two of the better known proponents of the view. First, I examine the 
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work of Stuart Hall, a leading figure in cultural studies. Hall openly declares that he believes 
the connection between the discursive and the extradiscursive to have the status of a wager, 
that is, the status of an interesting but ultimately unimportant side issue that should not 
concern thinkers. In response, I analyze parts of his influential cultural studies textbook, in 
which he tries to detail how he arrives at some of his most far-reaching conclusions. I try to 
show that Hall's arguments are untenable because his theory of representation adopts a 
theory of signs that in effect rejects the very possibility of signification. Because of the 
influence of Stanley Fish on English studies, I look at his definition of rhetoric as "passionate 
partisan discourse" and his attack on the concepts of truth and objectivity. The implications 
of these arguments for critical pedagogy are rather obvious. The starting point for critical 
pedagogues is their recognition that some people in society or across societies are being 
oppressed and exploited. These pedagogues do not believe that they are mistaken in their 
beliefs or that although they are correct in their beliefs, those who exploit and oppress people 
are equally correct in their beliefs for thinking that they are doing the exploited a favor. I try 
to show that Fish is wrong about his most ambitious claims at several levels. In the last part 
of the essay, I argue that these implausible views (and the many—systematic— 
misunderstandings of the views of thinkers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Kuhn, and De 
Saussure) come from a failure to appreciate some of the many wide-ranging implications of 
the most important shift in the history of philosophy, from a static view of knowledge to a 
dynamic one that foregrounds human life and action. 
This article will be submitted to Journal of Advanced Composition. 
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CHAPTER 2. HOW PROFESSIONALS FORM THEIR IDEAS: 
AN URGENT RESEARCH DIRECTION FOR RHETORIC 
AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 
To be submitted to POROI (Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry) 
Iraj Omidvar 
Abstract 
In this paper I argue that a major line of inquiry in rhetoric and professional 
communication should be how ideas are formed in professions. The paper examines a recent 
comprehensive survey of the definitions of professionalism and professional communication 
in technical and professional communication articles in order to show that a key defining 
characteristic of professions is their ability to control the production and application of ideas. 
Since the assumptions underlying Aristotle's characterization of rhetoric as "advocacy" or 
persuasive communication of already formed ideas are thoroughly rejected in contemporary 
thought, the paper argues for a definition of rhetoric in professional communication that 
recognizes the social, communicative, and activity-based character of knowledge and 
foregrounds discovery and invention. This definition significantly expands the range of 
issues with which professional communication scholars have concerned themselves—how 
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well professionals communicate their already formed ideas—to include issues related to how 
ideas are produced and applied in professions. The growing professionalization of society 
and the shrinking public sphere should serve as strong motivators for rhetoricians to take up 
this expanded research direction. 
Introduction 
In this paper I argue that a major line of inquiry in rhetoric and professional 
communication (RFC) should be how ideas are formed in professions. This paper has five 
parts. First, to formulate a clear definition of professions, I examine a recent article in the 
Journal of Business and Technical Communication that concerns itself with defining 
professionalism and professional communication. Second, I argue that the Aristotelian 
conceptualization of rhetoric as what Perelman calls "advocacy" or persuasive 
communication of already formed ideas is no longer tenable because Aristotle's extra-
rhetorical methodology for arriving at knowledge has been discredited. Rather, the new 
conceptualization of rhetoric recognizes that knowledge is arrived at through communicative 
social interaction in the process of communal activity. In the new conceptualization, 
discovery and invention are foregrounded. Thus, as a discipline, rhetoric should be attentive 
to how ideas are formed in a given context. And as pedagogy, it should aim to teach students 
how to examine the context in order to arrive at sound judgments and to give good advice. 
Third, I explain what I mean by studying idea formation in professional communication and 
why I think it is important that this line of inquiry be taken up with more diligence in RFC. 
Fourth, I offer as a very informal example a professional environment in which I once 
worked, to indicate what kind of questions the type of inquiry I propose would inevitably 
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give rise to. Finally, I offer a list of professional settings in which this type of inquiry can be 
conducted. 
Profession and Professional in Professional Communication 
In "Professional Identities: What Is Professional about Professional 
Communication?" published in the July 2002 issue of JBTC, Brenton Faber, while attempting 
to define professional communication (PC), offers an extremely useful and long-overdue 
review of literature in our discipline. He aims specifically to differentiate PC from "service 
learning, workplace writing, online communication, and other forms of occupational 
communication" (306), thereby rejecting both overly broad definitions of professional 
communication, e.g., as communication to bring about some end beyond the experience of 
discourse, and overly narrow definitions, e.g., communication directed "to and from a group" 
(311). Such definitions, he writes, not only do not distinguish PC from other occupational 
communication, but they do not help us see the individual communicator's position "within a 
social or cultural context" (310-311). I contend that although (a) Faber's preliminary 
justifications for narrowing the scope of the definition of professions are inadequate (b) his 
later review of articles that look at how professions themselves attempt to and in fact do 
establish their professionalism through communication practice permits a much broader 
definition. 
Faber narrows the term professional to refer to what "literature on the professions 
[refers to] as professional guilds: doctors; lawyers (not in-house corporate lawyers); clergy; 
university professors; and, in a negative example of a deprofessionalized group, teachers" 
(309). This narrowing is justified, Faber writes, because professions were developed to 
provide vital services "as an occupational sector separate from government and capitalism''' 
(309). The goal of professions, though profitable, is "not to maximize profit but address the 
needs of people who require services that are essential to their well-being" (309). By limiting 
himself to professional guilds, he excludes several professions associated with PC: "bankers, 
engineers, accountants, or administrators who supervise professionals" (309) because these 
are "employees of capitalism ... who broker between the interests of capital (revenue 
generation and economic efficiency) and the provision of services" (309). Moreover, these 
groups do not "come together as political entities, they do not have central associations (e.g., 
the American Medical Association), they do not control their occupational space, and their 
projects, employment, and quality control are subject to capitalist oversight" (309). 
I believe that this narrowing of the definition is unjustified, for several reasons. First, 
the groups excluded are political entities and have central associations. Bankers have, for 
example, the American Bankers Association; engineers have dozens of associations; 
accountants have the American Accounting Association; and administrators have the 
American Society of Public Administrators and the American Management Association. 
Moreover, these associations come together as political entities. For example, the Web site 
of the American Bankers Association lists a number of its public advocacy successes in 
changing federal laws. The influence of engineering as a profession on national legislation 
should need no exposition. Engineers do not really have to seek the law, for the law itself 
has a direct interest in the activities of engineers. Activities of groups such as architects and 
engineers are considered so vital—and so potentially dangerous—that state governments 
have a hand in their education, certification, and continued supervision. 
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Second, I see no reason why workers in corporations or governments should be 
disqualified as professionals. For one thing, many workers (including physicians in private 
hospitals and clinics, lawyers in large private firms, and a great many professors in four-year 
colleges) acknowledged as professionals by Faber work for corporations. For another thing, 
corporations can be looked at as organizations dedicated to wealth production, but they don't 
print money; they can also be looked at as organizations that offer products and services, and 
some of those products and services are definitely "essential to ... [people's] well-being" 
(309). It is true that professionals working for corporations may have limited control over 
"occupational space, and their projects, employment, and quality control" (309). But perhaps 
those are conditions under which some of the professionals Faber recognizes also work. Iowa 
State University's Human Resource Services list of available professional and scientific jobs 
(as of 2/28/03) was as follows: accountant, administrative specialist, programmer, systems 
analyst, assistant director, program coordinator, project manager, director, engineer, program 
specialist, manager, program assistant, research associate, psychologist.1 Faber's definition 
will permit PC to study only the communicational activities of the psychologist. I believe 
Faber's preliminary definition is too narrow. 
A more useful approach to defining professions would take into account the radical 
division of labor in industrial societies. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith explains that 
industrialization is a process in which complex tasks are broken down into extremely simple 
ones so that either workers or machines can do those simple and repetitive tasks; the product 
will be put together later in small steps by successive groups of people who handle the 
progressively more-processed materials given to them by earlier sets of workers and 
1 http://www.hrs.iastate.edu/jobs/jobs.html 
machines (9-18). The goal is to produce more (productivity) through simplifying and 
streamlining the production steps (efficiency). In this arrangement, some people have to be 
willing to do the boring, repetitive—and thus physically straining and difficult—unsatisfying, 
demoralizing work. These low-skill workers usually do not have to make vital decisions 
about the processes of which they are a part. The work they do individually is not valuable, 
and they can be replaced. (Despite all the fashionable drone about the wonders of our being 
in a post-industrial, information-intensive society, most products we use continue to be 
manufactured through the dehumanizing processes of the radical industrial division of labor.) 
Another side of this arrangement, however, is greater and greater specialization of tasks. If 
the factory is making an automobile, there will be several production units: a few design 
units, a few engineering units, the seat assembly unit, the engine assembly unit, etc. The 
engine assembly unit may need to assemble a thousand parts, so there will be sub-units, with 
workers and specialists in each group. The people who do the repetitive tasks cannot see the 
broader picture. They do not see which work has to be done before other works; a specialist 
manager does that. Another specialist will have to standardize tools. Because some 
specialist manager may be too busy to deal with employees directly, a human-relations 
specialist does that job. 
Manufacturing constantly spins off specialized production units, a great many of 
which leave the manufacturing plant and create their own manufacturing plants. According to 
Karl Marx, (cf. Capital, Volume 1,455-491), this pattern eventually—as in our post-
industrial, information society—leads to a "social division of labor" (475). As instruments of 
labor become specialized (differentiated), "the trades which produce these instruments 
themselves become more and more differentiated" (473). Marx writes that if values other 
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than wealth production are not taken extremely seriously—as happens in the United States— 
then capitalism and its industrial needs "will turn the whole of society into a factory" (477). 
The self-replicating pattern is simple. Instead of guilds of skilled artisans and craftspeople 
making a limited number of expensive products, large manufacturing plants consisting of two 
sets of workers manufacture large quantities of cheap products: The two sets of workers are 
(1) workers who do mind-numbingly simple, repetitive tasks and (2) specialists, who 
coordinate, design, make decisions, and solve problems. Group two, which receives 
education and enjoys a high standard of living, is part of a class that by virtue of its privileges 
is a de facto political elite; since medieval times this group has become progressively more 
specialized. 
Faber's later review of articles about how professionals included in his tentative 
definition describe their own communication practices shows that those descriptions support 
both my expanded definition of professions and my claim that the type of rhetorical study I 
propose—research into the formulation of ideas—should be undertaken. Faber writes that 
professional communicators have three characteristics: First, "Professionals typically 
prepare information for specific, or even individual, audiences (e.g., patients, judges, 
students, clients)" (313). Second, the work of professionals is "accountable to the larger 
community and is meaningful if it teaches and informs practice in some way" (313). Third, 
professionals engage in "a self-conscious discourse about values, conduct, and what is 
perceived to be proper action" (314). In the context of the third characteristic, Faber 
repeatedly suggests that professionals have a great deal in common with experts. He writes, 
"professionals are specialists whose principal occupational responsibility addresses ethical 
and political issues, they create for themselves ethical identities that enable them to be 
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advocates for specific social causes and social actions" (314). Their need to advocate comes 
from "their monopoly position as knowledge specialists, from sociopolitical activism and 
struggle, and from their own ideological values" (314). Their credibility comes from the fact 
that "they position themselves as sole providers of vital, knowledge-based services" (314). 
They attempt to "control the market for their services by creating a monopoly on their 
specific forms of knowledge" (315) and by "establishing self-regulating licensing standards, 
certifications, boards of review, and peer-review processes that preclude nonprofessionals." 
Finally, professionals enjoy relatively high social and economic status and "are viewed as 
knowledge experts" (315). 
An outline of the characteristics of professionals that Faber mentions is as follows: 
professionals do work "that is accountable to the larger community" (313) on "ethical and 
political issues" (314); have a self-conscious discourse about values and conduct; are 
knowledge experts who enjoy high social and economic status, who monopolize their 
position as knowledge specialists by "self-regulating licensing standards, certifications, 
boards of review, and peer review processes that preclude nonprofessionals" (315), use 
various forms of instrumental rationality, which helps maintain them as "an elite class" 
(318)/ 
This outline is not incompatible with the notion that professionals are those people 
doing the thinking part of the intellectual division of labor that goes along with the industrial 
and social divisions of labor. Professionals assume positions of authority, leadership, and 
responsibility; they are educated or well-trained specialists, technocrats (Faber 318), experts, 
2 Regarding the latter characteristic, Carolyn R. Miller in "The Rhetoric of Decision Science" argues that the 
dominant model of rationality—"instrumental-technical rationality" (178)—"encourages our submission to 
technical, knowledge-based solutions for what are social, value-based problems" (179). 
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social engineers, problem solvers, higher-level thinkers, and decision makers, especially— 
but not necessarily—in complex institutions or in the context of complex institutional 
relations. For example, they may be subcontractors of larger corporations of of governments 
or provide not-for-profit services to people. Notwithstanding Faber's prohibition, they make 
decisions and solve problems at the instrumental level, at the level of the rational assessment 
of values (318), and at the level of policy making. Sometimes they serve under elected 
political leaders as bureaucrats; sometimes they are professional politicians who work in the 
complex, long-established, and highly organized institutions of our representative 
democracy. In short, they include journalists, professors and teachers, medical experts, 
architects, engineers, lawyers, clergy, police officers, pilots, scientists, bureaucrats, 
administrators/managers/executive officers, and researchers. 
What Should Rhetoric Study? 
In the following two sections, I argue that RFC should be concerned primarily with 
studying idea formation in the professions, as I have defined the term above. A review of 
key problems with the classical definitions of rhetoric shows that the subject matter of 
rhetoric has not foregrounded the issue of idea formation. The new non-Aristotelian 
formulation of rhetoric sees communication of already formed ideas or Aristotelian rhetoric 
as a small part of rhetoric. The research direction I propose is an extension of the work being 
done by feminist philosophers of science and rhetoricians of inquiry. Their insights should 
serve as a starting guide in RFC research, insights such as value-ladenness of all inquiry, the 
presence of culture-wide biases, the situated or perspectival nature of inquiry, and the 
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presence of "perspective limiting hierarchical structure of society" (Harding, "Value 
Neutrality" 361,363). I conclude this section by offering a few arguments for the 
importance of studying idea formation in professions, and I argue that the preliminary value 
guiding this line of inquiry in the discipline should be an unabashed and genuine 
commitment to democracy. 
Rhetoric as a discipline should be concerned primarily with the formation of ideas 
through communication, because the classical and traditional justifications for narrowing its 
scope have been repudiated. Rhetoric has a long history of concerning itself with forceful, 
effective, or persuasive communication or advocacy of already formed ideas. Richard 
Whately, who according to Bruce Herzberg and Patricia Bizzell believed that Aristotle's 
theory of rhetoric "has never been superseded" (1000), makes a sharp distinction between 
philosophy and rhetoric. He writes, "Philosophy is in the business of inferring, that is, 
investigating and discovering ideas. Rhetoric, on the other hand, has the job of proving, or 
advocating those ideas" (1005). A similar definition of rhetoric is operative with Alexander 
Bain, who writes, "Rhetoric discusses the means whereby language, spoken or written, may 
be rendered effective" (1146). Likewise, Adams Sherman Hill writes that rhetoric does not 
observe, discover or classify. Rather "it shows how to convey from one mind to another the 
results of observation, discovery, or classification; it uses knowledge, not as knowledge, but 
as power" (1149). Rhetoric does not tell a person "with something to say" but "how best to 
say that with which he has provided himself' (1149). And Chaim Perelman notes that 
rhetoric has been held in contempt by philosophers because Aristotle believed rhetoric 
"taught only how to present a point of view—that is to say, a partial aspect of the question" 
(1391). 
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The reasons behind this pervasive traditional formulation of rhetoric have their roots 
in the Platonic-Aristotelian definitions of rhetoric, which were for their part based on 
objectivist formulations of epistemology. Those formulations are no longer credited by 
rhetoricians or philosophers. 
The Aristotelian Approach: Communicating Already-Formed Ideas 
Aristotle believed that he had access not only to absolute truth in a great many areas 
of knowledge and life but also to reliable epistemological methods for examining issues of 
concern to him. Rhetoric has occasionally, but mistakenly, taken to be a tool for examining 
and exploring important questions in any field. The mistake finds its roots in the scope, sheer 
quantity, and complexity of Aristotle's writings comprising his philosophical system, which 
is a theory of knowledge, of being, of God, of the natural world including physics, 
astronomy, and biology, and of politics and ethics. His theory of knowledge is the original 
justification for various forms of objectivism in that it finds a foundation for certain 
knowledge, a-perspectival and absolute—an unqualified convergence of knowledge (truth) 
and reality or of reason and cause. His theories of being and god constitute the original 
philosophical justifications for the claim that the universe is moral. In other words, he 
claimed that more or better formed beings are better than less formed beings, and using that 
claim, he found a source of ultimate value independent of humans. Using a series of 
dichotomies—form and matter, mind and body, soul and mind, etc.—along with the concept 
of final cause (which says that the cause of an acorn is the grown oak and is a theory of 
process and change), he claimed to have identified a hierarchy of values in the very nature of 
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the universe, which justifies various ethical and political ideologies, such as the original 
systematic justifications for slavery, patriarchy, and inequality generally. 
Aristotle's students studying his On Rhetoric, were expected to have been already 
well versed in his teachings on ethics, politics, and knowledge explained elsewhere. Aristotle 
writes that "rhetoric is an offshoot" (154, translated by W. Rhys Roberts in The Rhetorical 
Tradition) of ethical and political studies. But he does not mean that rhetoric is a tool for 
understanding ethical and political subjects. The principles and generalizations of those 
fields have already been made in other works of Aristotle. What he means is that the 
practitioner of rhetoric should already be in possession of that knowledge. What he thinks 
about justice, reasoning, women, slavery, the demos, democracies, etc., are all background 
assumptions of the ideas he advances in On Rhetoric. The dependence of On Rhetoric on his 
other works can be seen in that several of his foundational works are actually named in the 
text. For example, he explicitly refers to Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Ethics, 
Politics, and Methodics, Poetics, and Theodectea. And there are frequent references to 
concepts, definitions, and discussions elaborated in those works.3 Of course, even without 
such references those foundational concepts are embedded in theoretical definitions and 
divisions of rhetoric. For example, when he talks about pathos, or appeal to emotions, he 
assumes that his students already know that he is talking about a faculty of the soul, "faculty" 
and "soul" being elaborate concepts playing crucial roles throughout his philosophy, and the 
emotional faculty being one of the faculties with distinct characteristics. 
Aristotle goes through great lengths to identify a basis for reliable knowledge 
(episteme) in his oeuvre, a basis having nothing to do with either civic or communal 
discourse. His overall attitude towards the demos of his time—and therefore the possibility 
of civic discourse—can only be justified through a thorough-going epistemological elitism, 
which his philosophy represents. In "Oppression, Emotions, and the Institutional Definition 
of Critical Thinking," I studied every description of audience that Aristotle offers in three 
translations of On Rhetoric. I found that "for Aristotle, the audience of rhetoric—that is, the 
public sitting in courts, assemblies, and public events of Athens—is characterized by 
descriptions that have been translated as weak-minded, of limited intellectual scope, mob­
like, base, low-grade, morally weak, defective, or corrupted" (144). Rhetoric for Aristotle is 
not concerned with knowledge production. The sections in On Rhetoric dealing with ethical 
and political issues are meant to offer his students who are already in possession of 
knowledge a brief survey of the disheveled landscape of the confused ideas and views held 
by the "many" who are ruled by their emotions. The problem that On Rhetoric tries to answer 
is how to persuade the demos, who, in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says are impervious to 
argument and seem capable of responding only to force because they "live by their feelings" 
(1179b 9-18, Terence Irwin's translation). 
Like George Campbell, whose job as a preacher required him to persuade a less-than-
animated Sunday-morning audience of the truth and value of the gospel (938-944), students 
of Aristotle's rhetoric do not see themselves preparing to manipulate a trusting audience. 
Rather, they are preparing themselves to help a confused and weak-minded audience—not 
really to understand—but to think and behave according to the dictates of Truth. Children, 
patients, and the audience may not know what is good for them; they may have inklings of 
the true and the good, but they do not have the intellectual education and tools to determine 
3 See, for example, the index to Kennedy's translation of Rhetoric. 
for themselves. In this context, On Rhetoric can fairly be considered a manual for one-way 
persuasion of an audience of the communicator's already formed—and presumably good— 
ideas.4 
The formulation of the problematic of On Rhetoric is a direct result of Aristotle's 
views about democracy and the demos and his epistemological hierarchy, according to which 
ethics, politics, and theology were disciplines outside the sphere of civic discourse. He 
believed in what we practice in modern times, namely, that knowledge is a property of 
experts and that politics should be studied by political scientists and ethics by ethicists. 
Aristotle's views are faithfully reflected in James Kinneavy, who writes, universities should 
teach "three quite different kinds of thinking—scientific (in logic and dialectic), persuasive 
(in rhetoric), and aesthetic (in the study of literature, the grammar of the tradition)" (73). 
Experts have to learn to speak to non-experts for a variety of reasons (for example, so that the 
public can hold the experts accountable). So his formulation of rhetoric is "the ability to 
address the populace in persuasive language that, to be listened to, will often have to be 
intensive, even impassioned, audience-based, and stylistically appropriate to a segment of the 
populace" (74), along the lines in which the public is currently being addressed by political 
and military scientists. 
4 Both Chaim Perelman (1390) and Gregory Clark (27-32) argue that Aristotle's discussion of dialectical 
reasoning in On Rhetoric is offered as his authorized way of rationally assessing values. I acknowledge the 
usefulness of the topics in On Rhetoric for seeing different sides of arguments. And I am willing to accept that 
Aristotle and perhaps his careful students were using the topics as discussed in On Rhetoric for that purpose. 
But I don't think Perelman and Clark's arguments take into account Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology 
as well as his overall views about the Athenian democracy, his political alignment with Macedonia (the victor 
and occupier of Athens), and Aristotle's views about intuition and demonstration. 
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The Deweyan Approach: Forming Ideas Through Communication 
The collapse of the theoretical justifications for the foundational claims of Aristotle's 
epistemology has created new problems and suggested new formulations of communication 
and language. Aristotle's sharp separation of human values and emotions from what he 
considered certain knowledge has left contemporary philosophy of science unequipped with 
a theory allowing rational assessment of values. Chaim Perelman, for example, notes "the 
lack of success in developing a logic of value judgments" (1377) and invites further research. 
But there have also been extraordinarily productive possibilities opened up for new 
formulations of communication and language. The common thread in the new formulations 
is communal human activity. People are already always in the world doing things. Since 
knowledge of the type Aristotle claimed to have has been proved impossible to acquire, 
knowledge and ideas and in fact language itself are considered formed through 
communication, that is, through symbolic interaction accompanying communal human 
activity. John Dewey, Barbara Hemstein Smith, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Michael 
Bakhtin, among others, have offered versions of this new formulation of communication. In 
this subsection, I describe this new formulation by focusing on Dewey and Bakhtin's views, 
Dewey's for his concentration on the activity context of communication and Bakhtin's for his 
emphasis on communication in the context of activity. 
In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, John Dewey identifies an organic basis for inquiry. 
Being in a state of flux and movement, organisms live in and with an environment. In order 
to maintain life, they seek equilibrium when they come out of balance with their 
environment. The beginnings of knowledge are from this activity to restore balance, so for 
example, when an animal is hungry, it will look around and search for food. Through 
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experience of searching for food, it forms a store of knowledge, in some animals in the form 
of useful habits and in higher-order animals and specially humans in the form of both useful 
habits and a store of memories (23-41). Humans, however, have the additional ability to use 
language, which has come about through the symbolic interaction (communication) of 
humans in their equilibrium-seeking activities. Thus, communication and language are 
bound up with and subsumed under activity. Dewey writes that the meaning communicated 
through language "is established by agreements of different persons in existential activities 
having reference to existential consequences" (47). Through language, humans evoke 
"different activities performed by different persons so as to produce consequences that are 
shared by all the participants in the conjoint undertaking" (48). 
He writes that the behavioral change from organic to intellectual is "a product of the 
fact that individuals live in a cultural environment. Such living compels them to assume in 
their behavior the standpoint of customs, beliefs, institutions, meanings and projects which 
are at least relatively general and objective" (45). He defines language broadly to include 
"all means of communication such as, for example, monuments, rituals, and formalized arts . 
.. Language is the record that perpetuates occurrences and renders them amenable to public 
consideration" (20). The use of language implies a proto-philosophical definition of 
objectivity as intersubjectivity. He writes that, though emerging from biological activities, 
language "compels one individual to take the standpoint of other individuals and to see and 
inquire from a standpoint that is not strictly personal but is common to them as participants 
or 'parties' in a conjoint undertaking" (46). And thus, although language "may be directed 
by and towards some physical existence,... it first has reference to some other person or 
persons with whom it institutes communication—the making of something common" (46). 
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Finally, he argues that meanings of words come from their use in cooperative interaction. He 
writes, "The convention or common consent which sets [a particular physical object] apart as 
a means of recording and communicating meaning is that of agreement in action; of shared 
modes of responsive behavior and participation in their consequences" (47). According to 
Dewey, through language, we evoke "different activities performed by different persons so as 
to produce consequences that are shared by all the participants in the conjoint undertaking" 
(48). These last two statements are similar to formulations of Hemstein Smith's language 
loop theory: "the dynamic system of social interactions through which, without either mental 
telegraphy or meaning in any classic sense, communication (or something like it) seems to 
occur" (53). She writes, 
Communication may be seen as, among other things, a circuit or 
system of reciprocal effectivity, that is, a dynamic process that 
works—has appropriate effects, but not the same effects—for both 
those who act and those who re-act: speakers and listeners, or 
writers and readers (etc.), respectively. (The 'etcetera' here 
embraces all forms of reciprocally interactive agents, whatever the 
mode of medium—oral, textual, gestural, pictorial, tactile, 
electronic, and so forth—through which their acts and reactions are 
produced, or, in the instance, transmitted.). That circuit or system 
may be described as a set of more or less naturally occurring 
interlooping acts and reactions and their more or less appropriate 
consequences for the various parties involved: 'naturally 
occurring' in the sense that those acts and reactions are continuous 
with other forms of human (and in some respects, more broadly 
organic) action and reaction and, accordingly, require no special, 
unique mechanisms for their explanation. (54) 
Similar views have been expressed by Wittgenstein, who believed "that the meaning 
of concepts is given by their use in a practice" (Trigg, 19), that is, "concepts are "grounded 
in ways of acting." For Martin Heidegger as well, the primary relationship of humans with 
the world is functional. Humans are already and dynamically in the world, engaged in 
activities. Language is an outgrowth of the functional relationship of humans in the world. 
One of the most thorough elaborations of this function-based notion of 
communication and language is done by Mikhael Bakhtin through his use of the Marxian 
notion of praxis.5 Bakhtin does not see discourse as a stand-alone structure—or a "floating 
signifier." Words have no permanent, determinate meaning as standalone signs. In The 
Problem of Speech Genres, he writes that "all the diverse areas of human activity involve the 
use of language.... Language is realized in the form of individual utterances (oral and 
written) by participants in the various areas of human activity" (1227). The "diverse areas of 
human activity" is what Wittgenstein would call "forms of life." And Bakhtin's use of 
"speech genres" as "relatively stable types of... utterances" bears a striking resemblance to 
Wittgenstein's concept of "language games." 
In Dialogue, Dialectic, and Conversation, Gregory Clark writes that according to 
Bakhtin, "social knowledge is constructed in a cooperative exchange of texts" (8). Clark 
5 The pragmatist notion of truth may very well have its roots in Marx's thoughts. Bertrand Russell in History of 
Western Philosophy writes, "So far as I know, Marx was the first philosopher who criticized the notion of 
'truth' from this activist point of view" (784), the activist point of view being Marx's notion that "we only 
notice things [Marx's notion of truth and meaning] as part of the process of acting with reference to them, and 
any theory which leaves out action is a misleading abstraction" (784). 
argues that Bakhtin's view supports "a social constructionist point of view: that our language 
creates rather than conveys our reality" (9). In fact, Clark goes on to say that according to 
Bakhtin inner personality "is an expressed or inwardly impelled word" (9). Bakhtin argues 
further that "because the language we use makes us, unavoidably, participants in a meaning 
making dialogue, we must hold ourselves responsible for that meaning we help to make" (9). 
That is, one's "discourse must always interact with the discourse of others" and be "exposed 
to the judgment and response of others who hold the maker of the statement responsible for 
it." This view of language requires that we always view "communication as participants in a 
dialogue." We are always "on the boundary of self and the other" (Todorov cited in Clark, 
96). Consequently, anything we might communicate is 'wholly determined" by our 
immediate social experience and the broader social milieu" (Bakhtin, "Marxism," 86). 
Because we can understand our own experience only in terms of its commonality we are 
continually confronting each other with a mandate to construct from separate perceptions a 
common interpretation" (10). 
For Bakhtin, language is never neutral; we all bring our beliefs and values to a 
dialogue. "In actuality, we never say or hear words, we say or hear what is true or false, 
good or bad, important or unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on. Words are always 
filled with content and meaning drawn from behavior or ideology" ... (Marxism 70)" (10). 
All utterance should be "exposed to the collaborative process of judgment, revision, and 
redefinition that enables people to construct beliefs and values they can genuinely share" 
(10). Communication is the interaction of utterance and understanding through dialogue 
aimed at people who are trying to cooperate (13). 
According to Clark, for Bakhtin, understanding or response has a priority in dialogue. 
For the dialogue to be fruitful, there has to be a response, and the proper response is related 
to understanding (15). The kind of dialogics that Bakhtinian theory advocates calls for 
holding all utterances responsible; all texts of a community would have to be "read in terms 
of the particular social context in which they were generated, as texts situated 'historically or 
imaginatively in a field of other person's utterances (790). Second, all texts written by 
members of that community would be written dialogically, written both in response to what 
others have written before and in the anticipation of the responses of readers who will hold 
them answerable. Such discourse would sustain within the community a constant 
consciousness of where their texts come from, how they come to mean, and how they 
function there" (16)." 
The new formulation of communication sees knowledge, not as something we receive 
intuitively or discover through the application of a formula, but as something that we arrive 
at through communication in cooperative activity. In "The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an 
Intellectual Movement," Herbert H. Simons argues that rhetoric should be one "of invention 
and sound judgment in the conduct of inquiry" (20). The idea "of an emancipatory, dialogic 
rhetoric is one worth a central place in the academy. But it requires of us that we conceive of 
rhetoric, not simply as an art of proving opposites, but also as an art of arraying and 
comparing ideas after first having attempted to give each its most forceful expression. And it 
invites us to further conceive of rhetoric, not simply as an art of expression of or reader-
reception, but as one of intellectual exchange" (21). This is a vision of rhetoric that is similar 
to David Fleming's, in "Rhetoric as a Course of Study." Fleming suggests that we adopt a 
definition of rhetoric that goes back to Isocrates. He suggests that we should see rhetoric 
neither too broadly, as a synonym for persuasion, nor too narrowly, as an art or technique for 
bringing about persuasion "by means of a specific strategy" (176). Rather, we should aim to 
see rhetoric as a deep-rooted, practical skill that is valuable both for society and the 
individual. According to Isocrates, this type of rhetorical education aims at "sound 
judgement in dealing with particulars" (179). The goal is helping form a character, who 
according to Isocrates, "is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best 
course" (180), in addition to giving "good counsel." 
Simmons asks, "What then are the optimal conditions for productive intellectual 
exchange? What norms of discourse ought to guide processes of scholarly reporting, 
discussion, and debate? What institutional arrangements are most likely to facilitate 
adherence to those norms?" (21). As in the old Aristotelian philosophy, the new formulation 
needs a series of carefully developed and critically examined concepts. For example, the 
new formulation must take into account agency and consciousness. Are people's thoughts 
and behaviors wholly determined by their social environment; cultural, ideological, 
economical, etc.? Do people have any freedom? If yes, what is the scope of that freedom? 
Can they literally do anything they wish? But are they constrained by certain natural and 
social facts, forces, or realities? If Aristotelian/positivist objectivism is rejected, what type of 
objectivity can we claim? Why should anyone find our claims and arguments useful? In the 
next section, I will discuss the research direction I propose in light of the efforts of 
philosophers of science and rhetoricians of inquiry to examine similar issues. 
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Why Should We Foreground Idea Formation in the Discipline of Rhetoric and 
Professional Communication? 
Idea formation in the professions should be scrutinized more carefully along the lines 
that idea formation has been scrutinized by philosophers, sociologists, and rhetoricians of 
science (See, for example, the works of Karl Popper, Bruno Latour and Dorothy Winsor). As 
mentioned, rhetoric has traditionally been associated with advocacy and persuasion—not 
with "discovery." An understanding of the collapse of the foundational claims of 
Aristotelian philosophy means, among other things, that advocacy should be considered only 
a small part of a much larger process, which is founded on discovery or invention. This 
change in the emphasis of rhetoric should foreground idea formation in professional 
communication. And I don't mean merely how professionals think about how most 
effectively to communicate their already formed ideas about their subject matter—I mean 
how professionals form their ideas about the subject matter through communication. 
As Faber's and my synthesized definition of professionalism shows, the key 
characteristic of professionals that guarantees their social position is their access to 
specialized knowledge. The broad research direction I am proposing is a variation on what 
philosophers of science, sociologists of knowledge, and rhetoricians of inquiry have been 
doing for some time. In the next section, I am going to focus on only one of the findings of 
the feminist philosophers of science: the discovery of the omnipresence of values in all 
aspects of idea formation, and a review of some partial solutions to the problems that this 
discovery has had for inquiry. 
45 
Value-Ladenness of the Scientific Professions 
The new formulations of communication and language see all communities as 
locations where knowledge is produced. But knowledge production in professional 
communication is particularly close to scientific activity, for professions make a great deal of 
effort to model themselves after science; they claim to have access to specialized, systematic 
knowledge, and they emulate the methodologies and theories of science. Moreover, unlike a 
great many other—more innocuous—communities, the decisions that professionals make 
have wide ranging moral and policy implications. As I present the views and findings of 
theorists in this section, I will not explicitly and repeatedly connect those views to 
professionalism. The key insight of the philosophy of science is that inquiry is thoroughly 
infused with values and that an adequate theory of inquiry and idea formation requires some 
way of assessing and choosing among values. This insight applies as much to scientific 
inquiry as to idea formation in the professions. 
Helen Longino, a leading feminist philosopher of science, argues that "knowledge is 
shaped by the assumptions, values and interest of a culture" (54), and as we can switch 
cultures, we have a choice in the matter of what theories of science we accept. She writes, 
"We can continue to do establishment science, comfortably wrapped in the myths of 
scientific rhetoric or we can alter our intellectual allegiances. While remaining committed to 
an abstract goal of understanding, we can choose to whom, socially and politically, we are 
accountable in our pursuit of that goal. In particular we can choose between being 
accountable to the traditional establishment or to our political comrades" (54). 
Longino is not arguing for arbitrary intrusion of bias in inquiry. She is foregrounding 
the fact that establishment science already accepts certain "political considerations as 
relevant constraints on reasoning, which, through their influence on reasoning and 
interpretation, shape content" (55). For example, she points out that conducing science 
"requires financial support and those who provide that support are increasingly industry and 
the military. As might be expected they support research projects likely to meet their needs.. 
.. Our sciences are being harnessed to the making of money and the waging of war. The 
possibility of alternate understandings of the natural world is irrelevant to a culture driven by 
those interests. To do feminist science, we must change the social and political context in 
which science is done" (56). 
Sandra Harding writes in "Strong Objectivity: A Response to the New Objectivity 
Question" that the traditional model of objectivity, or objectivism, "defends and legitimates 
the institutions and practices through which the distortions and their often exploitative 
consequences are generated. It certifies as value-neutral, normal, natural, and therefore not 
political at all the policies and practices through which powerful groups can gain the 
information and explanations that they need to advance their priorities" ("Response" 337). 
Looking at a value-neutral definition of the scientific method, Harding observes, "the 
internal mechanisms for maintaining objectivity are, at their best—in the absence of 
sycophancy toward those with prestige, professional jealousies, narrow cliques, and national 
provincialism—able to nullify individual capricious errors and biases, but they reinforce the 
shared biases of the scientific community. The demand for objectivity, the separation of 
observation and reporting from the researchers' wishes, which is so essential for the 
development of science, becomes the demand for separation of thinking from feeling. This 
promotes moral detachment in scientists which, reinforced by specialization and 
bureaucratization, allows them to work on all sorts of dangerous and harmful projects with 
indifference to the human consequences. The idealized egalitarianism of a community of 
scholars has shown itself to be a rigid hierarchy of scientific authorities integrated into the 
general class structure of the society and modeled on the corporation" (quoted in "Response" 
by Harding on page 334. The passage is from Levins and Lewontin 1993, pp. 315-316). 
Harding sees the great challenge facing professionals (as I define them) to 
overcoming their thoughts. She writes, "In hierarchically organized societies, the daily 
activities of people in the ruling groups tend to set distinctive limits on their thought, limits 
that are not created by the activities of the subjugated groups. Administrative-managerial 
activities, including the work of the natural and social sciences, is the form of "ruling" in our 
contemporary modern societies, and the conceptual frameworks of our disciplines are shaped 
by administrative-managerial priorities, just as pre-scientific observations of nature are 
shaped by other cultural priorities. Such priorities do enable gaining the kinds of information 
administrators need to function effectively, but they also distort and limit our understanding 
of just what brings about daily social relations and interactions with nature, and they make it 
difficult to think possible any different kind of interactions. In order to gain a causal critical 
view of the interests and values hat constitute the dominant conceptual projects, one must 
start one's thought, one's research project, from outside those conceptual schemes and the 
activities that generate them; one must start from the lives excluded as origins of their 
design—from "marginal lives" ("Response" 341-342). 
When values are not explicitly highlighted and examined, Harding argues that "the 
neutrality ideal functions more through what its normalizing procedures and concepts 
implicitly prioritize than through explicit directives.... This normalizing politics frequently 
defines the objections of its victims and any criticisms of its institutions, practices, or 
conceptual world as agitation by special interests that threatens to damage the neutrality of 
science and its "civilizing mission", as an earlier generation saw the matter. Thus when 
sciences are already in the service of the mighty, scientific neutrality ensures that "might 
makes right". ("Response" 337). 
The traditional appeal to method for ensuring objectivity in science is wrong-headed 
because, Harding writes, "It is only after a research project is already constituted that 
methods of research, in the usual narrow sense of the term, start up" ("Response" 338). Her 
suggestion for scientists who do sincerely wish to understand and recognize the limiting 
effects of their dominant position in society is to adopt her standpoint theory, which requires 
that they "begin from the recognition of social inequality" ("Response," 341). 
Chaim Perelman recognizes that the sharp separation between judgments of reality 
and value stems "from an absolutist epistemology which tends to sharply separate two sides 
of human activity" (1377). He believes values can only be assessed in arguments. And he 
has compiled a list of characteristics that can help orators examine questions of value: The 
goal must be "adherence of the audience to some thesis" (1391). There has to be goodwill in 
orators to "persuade not compel." There have to be rules and "institutions to further 
discussion between competent persons and to prevent others." It has to be accepted that 
opposed positions may be "equally reasonable" (1392). The audience whose adherence is 
sought should be "thought of... as encompassing all reasonable and competent men" (1393), 
an "ideal" or "universal" audience (1393). In fact, aside from its effectiveness, the quality of 
an argument is measured by "the quality of the audience at which it is aimed." There are also 
very "general propositions which can serve, at need, to justify values" (1394). 
It is my belief that the question of values backgrounded within our own (and, where 
applicable, any other discipline of study) must be addressed for our research to begin to 
reflect the crucial insights of philosophers and sociologists of the last century. 
Where Might We Reasonably Look to Learn How Professionals Form Ideas? 
If for the Athenian thinkers of 500-400 BCE, the civic problems of their society came 
from a consideration of the instabilities of direct participatory democracy, I believe the great 
civic problems of our society come from the growing professionalization of our 
representative democracy. Professionals make the most important decisions in the country: 
what is true and real, what are public hazards, illnesses, shortcomings, problems, and 
possible solutions. Extraordinary decisions have been made during the last two years. Only 
recently, it was accepted as a true proposition—so certain and important as to justify a pre­
emptive war against Iraq—that Iraq posed a clear and present danger to us. More than two 
years ago, the U.S. government began manufacturing small nuclear weapons and adopting 
the doctrines/policies of unilateralism, of military pre-emption, and of first-use of nuclear 
weapons even against non-nuclear countries. 
In this context, it is striking that the news we read is collected, evaluated, and 
presented to us by professional organizations that seem not to be concerned with the value-
ladenness of the claims they are making. National and international policy decisions are 
being made in policy institutes, academia, and government bureaucracies run by professional 
political scientists and other experts of various kind, who give advice to professional 
politicians. The public has ceded an inordinate amount of control and supervision of its civic 
life to professionals. To many observers, political participation in the United States is at the 
level of going to a movie theater and choosing one of a dozen movies to watch, all of which 
have been produced by armies of professionals. 
The direction of research I propose is actually of far greater weight than that of 
philosophers of science. I would like to discover answers to the following questions: Who 
are the people making these decisions about war and peace? What are their values? And 
how do they arrive at their ideas? How do they earn and maintain the respect and trust of the 
public? Noam Chomsky questions whether intellectuals involved in policy making, who 
present themselves as experts, in fact have any kind of expertise. He writes, "Should 
decisions be left to 'experts' with Washington contacts—that is, even if we assume that they 
command the necessary knowledge and principles to make the 'best' decision, will they 
invariably do so? And, a logically prior question, is 'expertise' applicable—that is, is there a 
body of theory and of relevant information, not in the public domain, that can be applied to 
the analysis of foreign policy or that demonstrates the correctness of present actions in some 
ways that the psychologists, mathematicians, chemists, and philosophers are incapable of 
comprehending?" (66-67). Does Chomsky have a point? If so, how do such leaders 
maintain their positions? 
It is easy, and tempting, to say that professional decision makers are conditioned by a 
set of social forces, such as ideology or economic interest or that they are corrupt. I don't 
entirely reject those explanations. But assuming that we do have a level of freedom and that 
we can choose and learn, assuming, with Dewey, that my calling these professionals corrupt 
is a form of dogmatism that supposes "serious moral conflict is between something clearly 
bad and something known to be good" (266 Quest), and assuming with Nel Noddings that 
these are "people of moderate goodwill who have a natural interest [at least] in their own 
well-being" (164 Women), then how do professionals arrive at their decisions? And if as 
Noam Chomsky claims the problem is that "the norm [in our society] is obedience, adoption 
of uncritical attitudes, taking the easy path of self-deception" (39), then how has that norm 
been established? 
According to Fleming, the ultimate goal of rhetoric is preparing people for a "genuine 
and open-ended democracy" (180). I agree, and the value-laden framework of my proposal 
is a desire for strengthening democracy based on the belief that democracies place the best-
known curb on the exercise of arbitrary power, which arises from dogmatism. 
I think we can take from Bakhtin, who lived under one of the most brutal tyrannies in 
history, that whatever rhetoric is, it should promote dialogue and understanding. He believed 
that only through the dialogic process of utterance and understanding can communication 
"function ethically by enabling us to decide what is true and what is not, what is good and 
what is not, and what we will, both individually and collectively, believe and do" (17). 
Informal Example of Idea Formation in the Profession of Agricultural Science 
I this section, I will offer a broad outline of an organization in which I worked in 
order to highlight some of the questions to which the research direction I propose gives rise. 
Between 1996 and 1998,1 worked as a database manager at a nonprofit organization, which 
was a consortium of 36 scientific agricultural associations from technology-intensive, 
generally pro-red-meat scientific disciplines in agriculture. The stated goal of the nonprofit 
organization was to educate representatives, policy makers, and the public about agricultural 
issues. There were two board meetings a year. And each of 36 associations selected and sent 
between one and three high-ranking (usually middle-aged, well-known, male scientists, 
department chairs, deans, even former university chancellors) members to the meetings. 
There was an executive committee that made key decisions and presented the board with 
proposals. Board meetings had a general session after which a keynote speaker took the 
rostrum and short, pro-forma debates were held on a few issues. Board meetings were 
mainly good for (a) selecting issues (in committees) to write reports on and (b) voting on the 
priority of research topics and on questions forwarded by the executive committee meeting. 
There was a staff of 10, with two poles of power: the EVP and the Science Editor. The EVP 
was in charge, traveled, was paid well, and not surprisingly had strong social skills. The 
EVP was in contact with the advisory board, which consisted of select donating corporations. 
The vast majority of the money came from corporations. The EVP would write personal 
renewal letters to large donors. He would also choose task force members to write reports. 
He and lead scientists made presentations to congressional panels. A communication director 
was in charge of the newsletter, the Web site, and press releases. On-going lip service was 
paid to the idea of expanding the membership base to reduce the influence of corporations. 
More serious efforts were made to get government grant money. A subcontractual lobbying 
firm in DC distributed, in person, copies of reports and discussed reports with representatives 
at their offices or in informal and formal meetings. The lobbyists' strategy was explained as 
follows: whoever is more organized, has the better prepared document, and gets more time 
with representatives wins. 
Dewey's theory of inquiry and communication would be particularly suited for 
exploring issues such as the following in the context I have just described: The effects of the 
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presence of institutional values and power relations on the formation of ideas at 
organizational staff, executive committee, board, board committee, advisory board, and 
scientific task force meetings; in Congress; in the lobbying firm; in financing corporations; 
and in connection to members and the public at large. Dewey's framework would also help 
us explore the conditions under which institutional values are examined (from outside or 
inside the very many different communities in the organization); how relevant problems are 
identified, formulated, or dismissed (within those communities); methods for coming up with 
guesses (tentative ideas); people allowed to or prevented from contributing to this process; 
operating theoretical frameworks for scientists and administrators; the processes by which 
goals and agendas are set for discussion and inquiry in various communities and in the 
organization as a whole; the effect of the interaction of the competing goals and values of the 
communities in relation to the larger organization and of the larger organization in relation to 
the society in which it operates; the patterns of competing goals and values that lend 
themselves to communities that do not produce good ideas; the way dissenting views are 
sought out, suppressed, permitted to be heard, or ignored. 
Dewey's theories also pose a set of questions for the individual 
participant/communicator in those communities. Are the ideas issuing from a community 
good for the communicator as the communicator would define the good for herself or 
himself? Do the good ideas of the community and the organization match his or her ideas of 
his or her rights, responsibilities, and privileges in society? In other words, is the 
communication environment conducive to his or her flourishing (or growth and development 
as Dewey would say) as a human being, a citizen, a parent, a spouse, or an employee? Does 
the organization empower the participant/communicator (in the Deweyan sense, does it allow 
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him or her to arrive at ideas freely, that is, through a process of unencumbered critical 
reflection about the means and ends of life)? Or does it allow his or her inquiring mind only 
a severely circumscribed scope? 
Suggestions for Future Study of Idea Formation in the Professions 
In this subsection, I will touch on the crucial areas that the new formulation of 
rhetoric allows RFC to study. 
In Journalism: An ethnographic study of news rooms, along the lines of Latour and 
Woolgar though perhaps without their problematic sociological assumptions. Consider the 
newsroom as a laboratory and examine how knowledge is produced and presented. What 
values operate in the production of news? What are the standards of objectivity? The 
methods of inquiry? Contrast public and professional perceptions of the field. 
In policy institutes (think tanks): Examine think tanks and public policy institutes, 
the selection of experts, the editorial direction of papers. Discuss foundational values of 
think tanks. What does it mean that a think tank is "conservative" or "liberal"? Do such 
assumptions ever receive scrutiny? What type of internal communication is used? 
Agonistic? Examine the source and roots of professional trust. 
The entertainment industry. An RFC colleague who has interviewed several 
composers for film in Hollywood and in Italian movie studios reports of the massive, 
complex professional organizations behind the making of films. Who are the people 
involved? What are their backgrounds and value systems? What ideas of human life, 
society, art, and politics do they have? How do end products with their embedded intentional 
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meanings come about? What processes and institutional and professional checks do ideas 
have to go through? What changes accrue to ideas through this process? Even assuming a 
maximally cynical view of the complicity of entertainment professionals, what are the beliefs 
of professionals about their moral responsibilities to the public? What Bakhtinian dialogue 
takes place before a product is produced? What are the structural forces at work? How do 
unusual, counter-hegemonic movies nevertheless occasionally manage to come out of the 
industry? How responsive is the entertainment industry to audiences? How far can the 
movie industry go in shaping the response of the audience? How consciously do 
entertainment professionals think about the effects of their movies? What do they explicitly 
and implicitly think about the audience? Who are the categories of real audiences? Does the 
entertainment industry assume an Aristotelian approach towards its audience? Is the movie 
industry a good metaphor for the relationship of all professional communicators with the 
public? 
The academy. RPC researchers have to study professional communication in the 
academy, and most specifically in departments where communication studies of one form or 
another are being taught. In fact, this project should be embedded as part of the very 
professional responsibility of any program of professional communication. The key question 
is how do professionals (say, in English departments) arrive at their administrative, 
disciplinary, and pedagogic ideas? What are the assumptions they bring in to their 
professions? What have they done to examine those assumptions? What institutional or 
social barriers or opportunities to examining those assumptions exist? How can conditions be 
created so that the best ideas can potentially be formed? What conditions are detrimental to 
idea formation? Assumptions about knowledge, research, and communication have to be 
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methodically identified and examined. Exit interviews with undergraduate and graduate 
students, faculty members, and administrators might be of use in this project. If rhetoric is to 
fulfill its ambitions as a discipline that can legitimately examine how any group of people 
forms ideas, then the discipline must simply be at the very forefront of all areas of research in 
which idea formation in all its manifestations is discussed: in physiology, psychology, 
sociology, philosophy, history, literature, political science, journalism, speech 
communication. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I argued that a major line of inquiry in rhetoric and professional 
communication should be how ideas are formed in professions. I established my claim in 
five step. First, I argued that professionals are those people doing the thinking part of the 
intellectual division of labor that goes along with the industrial and social divisions of labor. 
Second, I argued that any new conceptualization of rhetoric that wishes to avoid the pitfalls 
of Aristotelian philosophy should recognize that knowledge is arrived at through 
communicative social interaction in the process of communal activity. In the new 
conceptualization, discovery and invention are foregrounded. Two important implications of 
this conceptualization are that as a discipline, rhetoric should be attentive to how ideas are 
formed in a given context and as pedagogy, it should aim to teach students how to examine 
the context in order to arrive at sound judgments and to give good advice. Third, I explained 
what I mean by studying idea formation in professional communication by touching on how 
a similar direction in research has been pursued by two leading feminist philosophers of 
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science. I also argued that this line of inquiry be pursued in a more determined way in RPC. 
Fourth, I offered as an informal case study a professional environment I once worked in, to 
indicate what kind of questions the type of inquiry I propose would inevitably give rise to. 
Finally, I offered a list of professional settings in which this type of inquiry can be 
conducted. 
References 
Aristotle. 1985. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
Aristotle. 1990. "From Rhetoric.'''' In Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The 
Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Boston: 
Bedford Books, pp. 151-195. 
Bakhtin, Michael. 2001. "From The Problem of Speech Genres." In Patricia Bizzell, and 
Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to 
the Present. Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 1227-1246. 
Bakhtin, Michael. 2001. "From 'Marxism and the Philosophy of Language'." In Patricia 
Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from 
Classical Times to the Present. Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 
1210-1227. 
Bizzell, Patricia, and Bruce Herzberg. 2001. "Richard Whately." In Patricia Bizzell, and 
Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to 
the Present. Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 1000-1003. 
Campbell, George. 2001. "From The Philosophy of RhetoricIn Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce 
Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the 
Present. Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 902-947. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1987. "Interview." In James Peck, ed., The Chomsky Reader. New York: 
Pantheon, pp. 1-55. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1987. "The Responsibility of Intellectuals." In James Peck, ed., The 
Chomsky Reader. New York: Pantheon, pp. 59-83. 
Clark, Gregory. 1990. Dialogue, Dialectic, and Conversation: A Social Perspective on the 
Function of Writing. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Dewey, John. 1929. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Paragon Books. 
Dewey, John. 1938. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Faber, Brenton. July 2002. "Professional Identities: What Is Professional about Professional 
Communication?" Journal of Business and Technical Communication, 16, 3, pp. 306-
337. 
Harding, Sandra. 1955. "Strong Objectivity: A Response to the New Objectivity Question." 
Synthese, 104, pp. 331-349. 
Harding, Sandra. 1977. "Does Objectivity in Social Science Require Value-Neutrality?" 
Soundings, 60, pp. 351-367. 
Hernstein Smith, Barbara. 1997. Belief and Resistance: The Dynamics of Contemporary 
Intellectual Controversy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hill, Sherman. 2001. "From The Principles of Rhetoric." In Patricia Bizzell, and Herzberg, 
Bruce, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 
Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 1149-1151. 
59 
Kinneavy, James L. 1994. "Writing Across the Curriculum." In Charles Bazerman, and 
David Russell, eds., Landmark Essays on Writing Across the Curriculum. Los 
Angeles: Hermagoras Press, pp. 65-79. 
Kennedy, George A. 1991. "Index." In George A. Kennedy, trans, and ed., On Rhetoric: A 
Theory of Civic Discourse. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 329-335. 
Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. 1986. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific 
Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Longino, Helen E. 1987. "Can There Be a Feminist Science?" Hypatia, 2, pp. 45-57. 
Longino, Helen E. 2002. The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Marx, Karl. 1976. Capital. Volume One. London: Penguin Books. 
Miller, Carolyn R. 1990. "The Rhetoric of Decision Science, or Herbert A. Simon Says." In 
Herbert W. Simons, ed., The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the 
Conduct of Inquiry. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 162-184. 
Noddings, Nel. 1989. Women and Evil. California: University of California Press. 
Omidvar, Iraj. 2001. "Oppression, Emotions, and the Institutional Definition of Critical 
Thinking." Thes. Iowa State University. 
Perelman, Chaim. 2001. "From The New Rhetoric.'''' In Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg, 
eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 
Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 1375-1378. 
Perelman, Chaim. 2001. "From The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning." In 
Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from 
Classical Times to the Present. Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 
1384-1409. 
60 
Russell, Bertrand. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Simons, Herbert W. 1990. "The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual Movement." In Herbert 
W. Simons., ed., The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of 
Inquiry. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-31. 
Smith, Adam. 1991. Wealth of Nations. New York: Prometheus Books. 
Trigg, Roger. 2001. Understanding Social Science. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Whately, Richard. 2001. "From Elements of Rhetoric." Campbell, George. "From The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric." In Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The 
Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Second Edition. 
Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, pp. 1003-1030. 
61 
CHAPTER 3. LIMITS OF COUNTERING STEREOTYPES 
THROUGH THE USE OF VISUAL RHETORIC: A STUDY OF 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF IRAN 
Accepted for publication in Writing the Visual: A Practical Guide for Teachers of 
Composition and Communication, an anthology for Parlor Press's series on visual rhetoric 
Iraj Omidvar 
Abstract 
In this paper I explore what I learned from preparing a brief, photograph-intensive 
presentation after 9/11 to counter the widespread stereotypes of Iranians. As time progressed, 
I became increasingly concerned about the complexities involved in countering stereotypes 
with photographs, for example, about the danger of what amounts to replacing one set of 
stereotypes with another in the audience. I adopt an interpretation of Plato's dialogues that 
sees them as embodiments of the practice of philosophy—as opposed to a body of 
doctrines—to argue that the core of Plato's objections against believing that paintings 
represent the truth about the world remain important insights. According to this 
interpretation, Plato believed knowledge could be had through the dramas of living and 
62 
conversing, which Platonic dialogues attempt to recreate. In Plato's Socratic dialogues, 
interlocutors introduce ideas for discussion; Socrates interrogates those ideas; an aporia or 
crisis is reached; and new approaches to exploring the ideas are explored although often 
dialogues end without a resolution of the original issues. This interpretation allows 
stereotypes to be seen as ideas that are part of larger social conversations among various 
groups. And photographs for countering stereotypes can most effectively be used to create 
disruptions or aporias, crises of opinion, in those who stereotype, and perhaps to suggest 
possible paths to further inquiry, but they may be unable to do more. 
Introduction 
As an Iranian-American, I was overwhelmed by the war rhetoric being directed by the 
U.S. administration against Iran and the Middle East in the months after 9/11. My response 
was to create for a U.S. audience a visually intensive and dramatic presentation designed to 
counter stereotypes of my native land. This chapter provides a brief analysis of Iran as a 
curious lacuna in postcolonial scholarship, describes the theoretical perplexities that stymied 
my attempt to use visual images to counter American stereotypes about that country, and 
provides suggestions for implementing a writing pedagogy that helps students examine and 
counter stereotyped images. 
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The Absence of the Topic of Iran in Postcolonial Scholarship 
Lack of academic interest in non-Western cultures and especially in topics related to 
Iran has contributed to stereotypes of non-Westerners and Iranians. A consistent 
preoccupation of postcolonial studies has been the representation of the postcolonial subject. 
One of the most widely influential approaches has been Edward Said's Orientalism, an 
extended study of the representation of non-Western Arabs and Muslims by western scholars. 
According to Said, the Orient "that appears in Orientalism... is a system of representations 
framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western 
consciousness, and later, Western empire" (142). Representation is a driving concern of key 
postcolonial scholar Gayatry Spivak, who has been consistently on the look-out for "the 
possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the 
Selfs shadow" (Norton, 2193). Although these and other explorations have been invaluable, 
much of the work of postcolonial and cultural theorists has served to underestimate and 
perhaps undermine collective political or even effective scholarly activity. For example, 
Spivak argued, at least initially, that the subaltern could not be represented; worse yet, the 
subaltern could not represent herself. 
Terry Eagleton writes in After Theory that the field of postcolonial studies participates 
in a larger move by the Western intellectual left, away from a concern with collective 
political action to one with culture. This move, Eagleton argues, tacitly acknowledges the 
futility of political action. Anouar Majid, in "The Failure of Postcolonial Theory after 9/11," 
has also offered a sharp critique, noting that despite important successes with theories of 
hybridity, displacement, and exile, postcolonial theory had failed to "attenuate the agony of 
uprootedness suffered by Muslims and other people in the last half century" (7). Majid cites 
four Third World novelists (Cheikh Hamidou Kane, Tayeb Salih, Marietou M'Baye, and 
Abdelrahman Munif) who have written about cultural dislocations, identity crises, effects of 
colonialism, and resistance to destructive Western values that nevertheless have been 
internalized gradually—in short, about the peoples, societies, and cultures slowly being 
digested in the leviathan of capitalist economic globalization, a profoundly unbalanced 
interaction not designed to benefit those being digested. Yet for many postcolonial theorists, 
a middle class American's ability "to live in Chicago, to eat Moroccan, wear clothes made in 
China, drive Japanese cars, and speak Spanish" constitutes evidence that nationalism and 
other cultural exclusivities are collapsing and that "the world [is] being reborn as a pastiche 
of parts" (2). Majid states, in rebuttal, that the "Mexicans in Chicago do not prefer Illinois 
over their native states: They are simply forced into exile out of economic necessity" (3). In 
fact, it seems that postcolonial scholars have not been able to "read" the Iranian revolution so 
as to make it fit their theory. Even authoritative reports on the presence of a collective, 
powerful, and very successful political postcolonial movement have been ignored. Michele 
Foucault, who visited Iran specifically to see the revolution, announced to deaf ears that he 
had met in revolutionary Iran "an absolute collective will" (215), which he had thought was a 
"political myth.... something one would never encounter." Aside from cursory references, 
however, Iran is almost entirely absent from postcolonial literature (see indexes of Colonial 
Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, editors: Patrick Williams and Laura 
Chrisman and of Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, & Postcolonial Perspectives by 
editors Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat). Shallow or non-existent theoretical 
engagement with developments in Iran on the part of postcolonial scholars is surprising 
precisely because Iran represents countervailing evidence to the premature postcolonial 
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pronouncement of the irrelevance of nationalism and other unifying concepts—most notably, 
religious ones—to popular struggles. Arguably, the most important revolution of the second 
half of the Twentieth Century was the nationalist-religious revolution that took place in Iran 
in 1979, a revolution widely believed to have inaugurated the rise of fundamentalism in the 
Muslim world. In the glaring absence of any noticeable kind of critical engagement with 
Iran, what in the West we might otherwise know of that country—its diverse people, its 
lively intellectual communities, and its people's various lifestyles—has been reduced to 
sound bites and to stereotyped images. 
Representations of Iran 
As Iranian-Americans discussed the possibility of the United States invading Iran 
after the Axis-of-Evil speech by the U.S. president, I was struck by the realization that I had 
never seen an image captured by a non-Iranian—be it in magazines, television, or cinema 
from Iran—that showed anything desirable from that culture. 
Especially after 9/11, several books came out arguing that Islam has had a particularly 
violent past. For example, Morgon Nerval's The Fifteen Century War: Islam's Violent Past 
and John F. Murphy, Jr.'s Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest to the 
Attack on America—depicted Islam as a virulent ideology relying on violence to spread 
itself. (As if any genocide, I could not help reminding myself, held a candle to the tens of 
millions murdered in Europe during the World Wars.) Of course, the Shi'ite term ayatollah 
has connotations beyond merely autocratic, e.g., bloodthirsty or criminally insane. In 
drawings, photos, and newspaper cartoons, ayatollahs are regularly represented as shadowy 
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figures of pure evil. These visuals encapsulate the average American's fear of all things 
Muslim. 
Moreover, Iran is often mixed in with other countries and other cultures. For 
example, images of Iran in the media are overwhelmingly of deserts, and there has always 
been a fudging of lines between Arabs, Iranians, and Muslims even though (aside from the 
fact that there are Arabs who live in Iran and Iranians who live in Arab countries) calling 
Iranians Arabs mixes categories of as much importance and usefulness as those of Italians 
and British, or Catholics and Protestants. 
This absence of differentiation is also evident in the depictions of Iranian women. 
Unlike women in Saudi Arabia, Iranian women vote and drive. Unlike women under the 
Taliban, Iranian women travel freely in public and make up more than half the students 
attending postsecondary school. Nor are Iranian women forced to wear the burqua although 
they are required to wear a manteau and headscarf. But the movie Not Without My Daughter, 
in which religious Iranian men are autocratic monsters and religious women have the 
conniving mindsets of old Hollywood movies' harem slaves, illustrates succinctly what most 
Americans think of gender relations in Iran. 
As I began to construct the presentation, I assumed that the audience did not notice— 
and certainly was not outraged by—any of these stereotypes of Iran. I assumed, in short, that 
my audience would be mostly uninformed about international affairs, subjected to years of 
misinformation, and vulnerable to government perspectives barely if at all filtered through 
the media. 
I planned to begin my presentation with the crudest visual depictions of the 
stereotypes, to encourage discomfort in the audience. I wanted it to recognize the stereotypes 
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but also to reject their influence. To draw connections between the experiences of Iranians 
and the experiences of the audience, I planned to compare information about Iran, in terms of 
population, area, number of students, cell phones, etc., with information about the state I was 
living in. The visuals I chose would heavily emphasize familiar sights and images: cars, 
expressways, parks, streets, houses and apartment, children and parents, show, historical 
buildings and monuments. I also planned to present a great many positive facts and images 
about Iran: number of university students (over 1.5 million), literacy rate (over 85%), 
number of villages with electricity (more than 40,000)6 as well as images of stunning 
historical buildings (mosques, palaces, public baths, squares, bridges, Zoroastrian fire 
temples) and art (carpets, calligraphy, miniature paintings). I would admit that Iran is three-
quarters semi-desert and desert, but I would point out that most Iranians are mountain 
dwellers: Iran has two major mountain ranges with several mountains taller than any in the 
Rockies or the Alps. Another large segment of the population lives in an area twice the size 
of Taiwan, which has a Mediterranean to subtropical climate. There are traditional 
industries, but most of the country is heavily industrialized. For example, the automotive 
industry—including parts manufacturers—employs more than 500,000 people; these 
employees provide the livelihood for one to one and half million others, or the equivalent of 
half the population of Iowa or of Ireland (or the entire population of Estonia) making a living 
from manufacturing automobiles. Iran is self-sufficient in wheat production, itself providing 
the main staple food for its 70 million people. Such levels of production cannot be achieved 
without significant distribution of knowledge and capital. 
6 These numbers are taken from the Statistical Center of Iran. 
In recounting the history of Iran, I planned on keeping my focus on points of contact 
between Iran and the United States. I was determined to mention that the American financial 
advisor W. Morgan Shuster was greatly respected for helping the government of Iran put its 
finances in order before he was forced out of the country by the British. In countering the 
stereotype of Iranians as people who are at the core autocratic and antidemocratic, I was 
planning on devoting considerable time to the Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906, and I 
intended to mention the decision of Howard Baskerville (a teacher, probably a missionary) to 
join the revolutionaries during the siege of Tabriz by royalists. 
But I also knew that I did not want the audience to feel smug. I wanted to emphasize 
their complicity in events surrounding the U.S. government's relationship with Iran. I was 
going to mention the occupation of Iran during World War II, the American-instigated 1953 
coup against the democratically elected and popular Iranian premier, the U.S. support for Iraq 
during the bloody Iran-Iraq War—even after Iraq had used chemical weapons against 
Iranians. 
Problems, Theoretical and Practical 
Soon after beginning the project in earnest, I had to admit that my presentation 
conformed too closely to Aristotelian rhetoric and all the problems associated with that 
rhetorical model. For Aristotle, the rhetor has a vast advantage over the audience in terms of 
special knowledge, and the audience is considered incapable of following careful or lengthy 
lines of reasoning. Acquainting himself with the audience's likes and dislikes, establishing 
his own credibility, and using an abridged form of argument assisted with other techniques, 
for example, metaphors "to conjure before our eyes an image" of what is being argued 
(Lawson-Tancred, 238), the rhetor is in a position to present in the most persuasive way. In 
the rhetorical situation that Aristotle envisions, the rhetor dismisses out of hand the 
possibility of improving the ideas of all participants (including the rhetor) through an 
exchange of views. 
I encountered, in addition to these misgivings about the top-down style of 
communication I had adopted, two even more significant difficulties. One had to do with my 
use of images as a way of arguing about topics such as the condition of women in Iran. The 
other difficulty had to do with my growing appreciation for the range of topics that have to 
be examined to counter stereotypes effectively. I will begin with the first difficulty, which 
harkens to Plato's famous injunctions against the visual. 
Standard Accounts of Plato's Injunctions Against the Visual 
According to Moshe Barasch in Theories of Art, although Plato "never expounded a 
theory of the visual arts" (4), his philosophy had far-reaching and limiting implications for 
the development of visual art theory. Citing optical illusions involving water and coloring, 
Plato concludes that sense perception is "devoid of truth" (5), a view based on his broader 
understanding of the hierarchy of knowledge. Plato believed that behind the changing, day-
to-day world of the senses, there exists another unchanging reality, which is the world of 
Ideas or Forms, from which the world of the senses is copied (Huby 17-20). Plato 
considered true knowledge to consist of the knowledge of the World of Ideas—that kind of 
knowledge he called episteme. And what could be known about the impermanent world he 
called opinion or doxa; the latter, he divided into belief and conjecture, belief being opinions 
about concrete empirical things and conjecture being beliefs in phantoms, reflections, and 
shadows (or what does not really exist even as part of ephemeral reality) (20-22; see also 
Marias, 50). 
Plato considered the knowledge of the artist and painter to be conjecture and 
explained art and painting in terms of the concept of imitation, or mimesis (Barasch): as the 
empirical world is an approximation, or copy, of the real world of forms, the pictorial image 
is merely a copy or approximation of the material objects it imitates. And since an image is 
always constructed from a certain angle or in a certain light, it can never be more than a 
"suggestion or evocation" (5). The classic formulation of this view appears in Book X of 
Republic, in which Plato writes that a carpenter can be said to have a vision of the couch 
being made whereas the painter copies (makes an image of) a particular couch (596b-598c). 
Thus the painting is merely a copy of a copy (Barasch, 5), an image of an image—a 
conjecture. According to E. H. Gombrich, it is because the "picture conferred up by art is 
unreliable and incomplete" (127) and takes advantage of our weakness for illusions (optical 
and others) that painting is condemned as a form of sorcery (126-127) and banished from 
Plato's ideal state. 
There are, of course, many problems with the concept of mimesis as it relates to 
visuals. For instance, Gombrich notes that art works do not always have to represent 
something. Moreover, Gombrich shows that the idea of the artist as an imitator of things in 
the phenomenal world (for example, more detailed imitation of human bodies in statues) was 
a historical development of art in Plato's time. A competing and older conception of art saw 
the artist as creator, for the artist "has to know and construct a schema before he can adjust it 
to the needs of portrayal" (116). In other words, Gombrich argues, the work of the artist is 
much closer to that of the artisan (carpenter) at whom Plato looks so benignly. 
Shortcomings of the Standard Accounts of Plato 
But the standard accounts of Plato's concept of mimesis and of his injunctions against 
the visual are often too simplistic and ignore at least three sets of difficulties. First, not only 
is the use of images and of visual metaphors prevalent throughout the dialogues (e.g., 
metaphors of the chariot of the soul in Phaedrus and, in the Republic, of the cave, of the sun, 
and of the divided line), but visual metaphors are deeply embedded in the very concepts of 
Plato's philosophy (e.g., the word "idea" means image [Marias, 46]). 
Second, Plato is not categorically critical of painters and in fact uses painting 
analogies in some of his works. Barasch points out that Plato makes distinctions between 
illusionistic painters and poietic painters, approving of the latter as well as of Egyptian 
paintings, whose flat and rigid styles were supposedly closer to the permanent forms or Ideas 
(7, also Gombrich, 126). Poietic painters, in particular, could "let themselves be guided by 
what Homer described as divine" (7). According to one historical tradition, Barasch writes, 
Plato had in fact studied painting, and stylistic studies show that Plato had a competent 
knowledge of its processes (8). At times, Plato explicitly points out that what he is doing 
(say, defining statesman or Utopia) is like painting. For example, in the Republic, he 
explains that the ideal state must, in its development, pass metaphorically through the three 
stages of painting: "the first consists in preparing a clean, probably white surface; the second 
is the outlining, the drawing of a contour.... The third step is 'shading and coloring'" 
(Barasch, 9). And in Statesman, Plato again uses a painting analogy to argue for further 
elaboration of the definition of statesman (277c page 1043). 
Finally, one line of Plato's thought finds a more important role for art and imitation. 
According to Barasch, this line of thought, although it cannot be considered anything more 
than an intimation, has been tremendously influential in various Platonisms, including much 
of medieval philosophy. Artists are sometimes able to see and represent the true forms 
(Gombrich, 156). This idea is intimated, for example, in Plato's speculations on cosmology. 
In his 'likely scenario' there is a creator (a demiurge, a term used to describe artisans 
involved in manual labor) who sees the permanent and ideal forms and makes the world of 
the senses as an inferior (Barasch writes "likely and analogous," 7) copy, or image, of the 
permanent world of forms. 
Hermeneutic perplexities such as these strain our ability to discern a consistent set of 
Platonic doctrines regarding the visual. Some interpreters have argued that the importance of 
the dialogues does not rest in what they profess but in how they enact philosophy. Gerald 
Press, in The Columbia History of Philosophy, argues that viewing Plato's works as 
presentations of a consistent set of doctrines is bound to fail. He notes that Plato's Socrates 
frequently upholds episteme as the highest form of knowledge but just as frequently denies 
that he has any such knowledge. Plato goes out of his way to make discovery of his own 
views difficult (note that in no dialogue is there a character by the name of "Plato"). In 
various works, certain key ideas are strongly argued for, but in others just as strongly 
rejected. Most dialogues end with aporias, that is, without settlement of the issue that began 
the dialogue. What is more, the character of Socrates cannot be identified as the mouthpiece 
of Plato's doctrines since he is not present in all the dialogues, and in some plays only a 
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minor role. The more likely view of Plato's philosophy that emerges from the dialogues is 
that it is a kind of activity, not a set of credos; the dialogues embody the ideal philosopher 
(Socrates) as a "gadfly" (37) to politicians and others, an inquirer "aware of persons, facts, 
details and as morally serious, intellectually seductive, a theorist in and of the practical 
world" (35). According to Press, the dialogues aim to provoke thought to leave conclusions 
ambiguous, so as to challenge participants in the conversation (and readers) "to work out 
better answers" (43) and enact a way of life (33). The kind of knowledge found in the 
dialogues is not episteme as Plato defined it, then, but theoria—vision. Press writes, 
Theoria expresses how we encounter the Forms {Phaedrus 250b, 
Symposium 21 Id, Republic 402d) and posits seeing with the eye of the 
soul as the kind of thinking characteristic of the philosopher {Republic 
511c, Theaetetus 173e, Philoebus 38b, Timaeus 47a). Thus vision is a 
kind of knowledge that can be found in the dialogues, but it is not the 
dogmatic, prepositional sort usually desiderated. It is the sort of thing 
about which it can truly be said, as Socrates does about the Parable of 
the Cave, 'God knows whether it is true' (Republic 517b). (44) 
Referring to this parable, Julian Marias argues that it is meant to show that "what happens to 
the man in the cave is something that can be narrated, and it is, in its most profound 
dimension, the essence of philosophy; and this,... is something more clearly arrived at in a 
narrative than in a definition. What happens to the philosopher, the drama of philosophy, is 
what makes clear the structure of reality" (50). 
One disadvantage of looking at Plato's dialogues as works in progress enacting the 
activities of an ideal philosopher moving between ignorance and wisdom (Marias 56-58) is 
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loss of precision in terms of Plato's doctrines regarding visual presentation. But I think the 
gain is relevance and depth of insight into his overall approach to philosophizing, the set of 
historically contingent problems and questions to which he was responding,7 and a greater 
appreciation of philosophy as the process of directed but perhaps ultimately never-conclusive 
conversational inquiry aimed at education and in touch with important moral and political 
issues of the day (Press 34-35). 
Looked at in this way, that is, freed of the weight of various Platonisms, Plato's 
injunctions against the visual can be handled more flexibly and more usefully. Plato is not a 
foe of art, but rather, as Iris Murdoch argues, "a great artist attacking what he sees as bad and 
dangerous in art" (13). Press's re-interpretation also permits us to appreciate the core insight 
of Plato's injunction against images without being carried away by the great speculative 
lengths he traversed to find and pull together the loose ends of his many theories. 
So in this re-interpretation, what becomes of Platonic forms and Plato's injunctions 
against the visual? 
Plato's injunctions become simply the following: Inanimate images—e.g., single 
photographs or single cartoons, not film or animation—may be fundamentally inappropriate 
for representing or understanding relations that obtain behind the visible. From this reading 
of Plato, it would be an entirely fruitless and dangerous strategy merely to use the inanimate 
visual of, say, a frowning person holding a product (or associating a product with something 
that evokes a negative feeling) in order to counter the effects of an advertisement arguing that 
ecstatic happiness can be obtained through the use of that product by showing a smiling 
7 Hauser writes that he was responding in part to over-valuation of art as a result of the rise of the merchant 
class in Athens (90). 
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person holding the product (or associating a product with something that evokes a positive 
feeling). The strategy would fail entirely because although the effect of the original image in 
the ad may be muted or wiped out through the use of a counter image, the strategy concedes 
a much more important point: this use of image does not ask how we should go about trying 
to understand what makes us happy (or as Plato might put it, what a concept like 
"happiness" means). 
At some level, inanimate images are profoundly inadequate to the task of giving us 
knowledge of an issue, a society's political system, the living conditions of its citizens, its 
state of industrial development. The insight I attribute to a more playful and less doctrinaire 
Plato points to the likely inappropriateness of using exclusively or even predominantly 
images to help an audience understand topics such as Iran's socio-economic or cultural 
situation, the condition of women, history, heritage, etc. But what is in fact an appropriate 
way of helping an uninformed audience understand and learn about these topics? The 
knowledge and background of my intended audience posed particular difficulties because 
this audience was not merely uninformed or merely holding innocuous preconceptions about 
the subject matter. Rather it held stereotypes. And stereotypes are a special—complex and 
particularly inveterate—form of misunderstanding and false knowledge. 
Complications Involved in Countering Stereotypes 
In Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation, Michael Pickering acknowledges the 
usefulness of the classical model and the remedy it implies but advocates going beyond the 
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classical view that "stereotypes = 'distortions of the truth'" (75). According to the influential 
formulation of the classical model by Walter Lippmann, stereotyping 
involves the various ways in which the need for sound, reliable 
knowledge of the complexities of the modern world is 
compromised by the reliance of public knowledge on inadequate 
and manipulated media representations. (18) 
Thus, Lippmann attributed two contradictory features to stereotypes. On the one 
hand, he considered 
stereotypes as inadequate and biased, as endorsing the interests of 
those who use them, as obstacles to rational assessment, and as 
resistant to social change ... On the other hand, he regarded 
stereotyping as a necessary mode of processing information, 
especially in highly differentiated societies, an inescapable way of 
creating order out of 'the great blooming, buzzing confusion of 
reality' (ibid: 3). In this second, psychological sense, he equated 
stereotyping with broader patterns of typifying and representing, 
and indeed with our general means of thinking and making sense of 
the world and the peoples in it. (18) 
Pickering argues that the classical model as constructed by Lippmann has had two important 
and harmful consequences for subsequent efforts to study and remedy stereotypes: (1) The 
model implies—and has historically led to the belief—that the remedy to stereotyping is 
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merely provision of accurate information and (2) the model sees stereotypes as a matter of 
oversimplification of complex facts. 
Behind the simplistic link between stereotyped images and social roles there seem to 
be objectivist assumptions. In other words, the classical view seems to assume that there is 
an undisputed, agreed-on social reality about roles and cultural norms. Thus the remedy 
must remove the distorting clutter and, then, the reality of the role of, say, women in Iranian 
society will be made manifest. In fact, however, the social reality of gender relations and 
norms is itself a function of ideological clashes and negotiations. Pickering suggests that the 
concept of the Other, developed by feminists but also used extensively by postcolonial 
scholars, contributes profoundly to our understanding of stereotypes. For example, the 
concept of Other helps us see that characterizations of those who are Othered say a great deal 
about those who do the Othering. Moreover, the concept remains alert to historical, material, 
and cultural relations of power defining the terms of stereotyping (who can stereotype, what 
features will be stereotyped, how stereotyping changes). 
My original goal of countering the stereotypes of Iranians had to be rethought. The 
goal of countering stereotypes as merely replacing one set of images with another set, even a 
more accurate or nuanced set, gives up on the much more important and urgent goal of 
teaching and learning how to avoid stereotyping. 
Pedagogical Implications 
The ability of images to disrupt stereotypes has important pedagogical implications 
that Pickering's arguments do not quite explore. A modified Socratic method as interpreted 
by Press may help audiences and students counter stereotypes and avoid or resist 
stereotyping. This method has strong affinities with key tenets of critical pedagogy as 
articulated by Paulo Freire and Ira Shor.8 
Press argues that Plato wanted to suggest or to guide a dialogue through dialectic, that 
is, Socrates' way of questioning (elenchos), orally conducted, to educate intellectuals to 
become philosophers as Plato understood that term (34-35). Press writes that dialogues often 
begin with questions raised by Socrates "on matters of importance" (43). The questions aim 
to draw out opinions and answers, many of which are systematically refuted (elenchos). This 
refutation will result in a crisis (aporia) "when insufficiency of answers is recognized." At 
this point in the dialogues, Socrates suggests a different, often higher, logical or intellectual 
perspective in order "to approach the problem (through play or myth)." After this 
suggestion, discussion returns to original difficulties, without coming "to final, specific, 
positive conclusions." Rather, the conversation partners of Socrates and the readers of 
Plato's dialogues are left to "work out better answers for themselves." 
Images cannot aspire to represent a complex condition such as that of lower-middle 
class, Iranian, city-dwelling adolescents in a complex society, but by challenging stereotypes 
in their grossest manifestations—as simplified, contradiction-suppressing images—counter 
images may be able to result in SoCratic aporias as one step—not in replacing one set of bad 
stereotypes with a set of good ones but—in a wider effort to explore openly how stereotypes 
are formed as well as how a different approach to acquiring knowledge of people—an 
approach that is free of stereotyping—can potentially be had. In the classroom, a study of 
8 For Paulo Freire, critical pedagogy begins with the experiences of students, involves extended work on 
identifying problems, or what Freire calls, the contradictions in lived experience. Learning is envisioned as a 
dialogic process (praxis) that involves dialogic and sees the teacher as an artist (115). 
images that represent stereotypes can serve many purposes, among them the purpose of 
helping students understand the very nature of stereotypes. That goal fits within the broader 
one of college writing courses that explore how ideas are formed. 
A course unit I have prepared for first-year composition tries to combine critical 
pedagogy and Socratic dialectic. I briefly discuss stereotypes and ask students to discuss 
together and to work collaboratively to bring to class photographs or other inanimate images 
of stereotyped groups (immigrants, Arabs, feminists, Jews, African Americans, etc.). We 
discuss the photographs and explore the stereotypical elements. What is highlighted? What 
is considered positive, what negative? And how are negative and positive features indicated? 
For another class period, students bring to class several photographs of the same group of 
people that directly contradict some or all of the stereotypical elements. We discuss the ways 
in which the new photographs contradict the stereotypical elements. At this point in the unit, 
I introduce the idea that stereotyped images say a great deal about those who do the 
stereotyping. This topic is introduced as part of a special kind of rhetorical analysis, with 
which students should be familiar from previous units. In regular rhetorical analyses, students 
have worked on identifying the audience, context, and purpose of various texts and 
documents. The same will be done with these photos, but special emphasis is placed on the 
"photographer." I put photographer between quotation marks because stereotypes often 
function subconsciously. And students are asked to speculate about the subconscious 
attitudes and purposes of the creator of the photograph. Students will try to see who the 
creator of the stereotype is (ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, etc.) by looking at what the 
creator sees in the stereotyped person. Students will then gather information about the 
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history of the relations between the stereotyped and the stereotyping group. Students end the 
unit by writing a paper about class activities and the research they have done. 
Conclusion 
For my presentation on Iran, the theoretical and ethical problems I encountered as I 
worked on the presentation helped me realize that photographs are incapable of conveying 
perhaps the most important type of information I wanted my audience to acquire, knowledge 
of the history and of the complex social and cultural conditions of Iran. Part of the problem 
had to do with what Gombrich notes: viewers bring their own interpretive frameworks to 
images. That's another way of saying that often viewers see in photos, for example, what 
they already know. Plato—or at least a reading of Plato along the lines that Press 
advocates—cautions against taking at face value the information that inanimate images seem 
to offer us and forgetting the experiences and stories or underlying relationships that have 
brought about the object an image may aim to represent. And theorists of stereotyping, such 
as Pickering, remind us that to counter stereotypes, we have to go beyond the stereotyped 
image to the interpretations, ideologies, and value-systems that the image serves and that 
stereotyping is just as much about the social groups that do the stereotyping (and their 
values) as it is about those who are stereotyped. If the goal is to go beyond replacing one set 
of stereotypes with another, that is, if the goal is to understand some aspect of the vast topic 
that is Iran, the audience has to be immersed in the narrative drama of the currents of thought 
with their roots in the material conditions and the historical development of Iranians. As part 
of that immersion—what Press would call philosophizing—photographs that counter 
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stereotypes of Iranian and Iranians can play a very powerful but limited role by disrupting 
certainties. 
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CHAPTER 4. REVISITING THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST 
TURN IN CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
To be submitted to Journal of Advanced Composition 
Iraj Omidvar 
Abstract 
In this paper I argue that the influence of poststructuralism in English and 
composition studies undermines the goals of critical pedagogy by eroding the meanings of 
such terms as oppression, liberation, and justice. The paper tries to show that 
poststructuralism suffers from debilitating objectivist assumptions by examining key 
poststructuralist arguments of two prominent figures in cultural studies and English studies. 
First, I examine the work of Stuart Hall, who believes the connection between the discursive 
and the extradiscursive to have the status of a wager, that is, the status of an interesting but 
ultimately unimportant side issue that should not concern thinkers. In response, I analyze 
parts of his very influential cultural studies textbook, in which he tries to detail how he 
arrives at some of his most far-reaching conclusions. I show that Hall's arguments are 
untenable because his theory of signs in effect rejects the very possibility of signification. 
Next, I look at Stanley Fish's definition of rhetoric as "passionate partisan discourse" and 
Fish's attack on the concepts of truth and objectivity and show that his arguments rest on the 
very objectivist assumptions he wishes to reject. In the last part of the paper, I argue that Hall 
and Fish's implausible views (and the many—systematic—misunderstandings of the views 
of thinkers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Kuhn, and De Saussure) come from a failure to 
appreciate the far-reaching implications of the most important shift in the history of western 
philosophy, from a static view of knowledge to a dynamic one that foregrounds human life 
and action. 
Introduction 
In a founding text of critical pedagogy (CP), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire 
writes that his theory of education can help "the oppressed unveil the world of oppression 
and through [...] praxis commit themselves to its transformation" (36). Every key term in 
this characterization—the oppressed, oppression, praxis, unveil, and transformation—refers 
to a cluster of theories, a set of problems and assumptions about issues such as freedom, 
justice, agency, and knowledge. But CP as conceptualized by thinkers such as Paulo Freire 
and Ira Shor has undergone a poststructuralist turn by thinkers such as James Berlin, Amy 
Lee, and others who believe this turn offers a more adequate theory of how CP should be 
enacted. I believe that that this poststructuralist turn, if not carefully tied to the notions of 
inquiry and praxis, presents insurmountable obstacles to enacting a CP. My specific 
argument is that notions of oppression as objective phenomena, and empowerment and 
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liberation as guiding concepts are necessary and justified as starting points for any enactment 
of CP. 
In this paper, I will first outline my understanding of the formulation of CP by Freire 
and Shor as well as its later poststructuralist inflection. I will then use the writings of Stuart 
Hall and Stanley Fish to examine key problems introduced to CP by the focus of 
poststructuralism on the structure rather than the function of language. I will try to show that 
this focus represents a failure to absorb the full implications of a shift of paradigms in 
philosophy, which the closely related ideas of praxis in Marxism and inquiry in pragmatism 
reflect. Although poststructuralist insights can be incorporated in the idea of praxis, this 
incorporation has to be done critically and cautiously, else the generative concepts of CP— 
freedom, empowerment, agency—lose their meaning, and any enactment of CP cannot 
escape the charge of indoctrination. 
Marxist Roots and Assumptions of CP 
One of the goals of CP is the unveiling of oppression. Freire writes, 
In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed 
by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those 
whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute 
ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of 
oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of 
inquiry. (53) 
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In the banking model, students are being taught facts about what he calls an 
"oppressive reality" (33), a reality devoid of consciousness. Instead Freire wants to help 
students see the oppressive characteristics of this reality so that they can envision another. 
Shor uses the term "false consciousness" to refer to structures of thought that prevent the 
oppressed from recognizing their oppression (55). Both Freire and Shor use the language of 
Marxism and talk of the possibility of liberating (Freire, 49), unveiling "dominated 
consciousness" (85) and social "domination" (Shor, 87), helping students to "to truly know" 
(Freire, 85) reality and "objective facts" (Freire, 35), promoting "liberatory learning" (Shor, 
268), and "empowering the object-subject switch" (113). 
These terms trouble critical pedagogues who have attempted to reconcile Marxism 
with a poststructuralist framework. As a result, in scholarly texts examining CP, there has 
been a slow turning away from terms like oppression, false consciousness, empowerment, 
and liberation. For example, Berlin warns against aiming to help students unveil ideology so 
that they can see the real and true state of affairs in the world since as he writes "every 
pedagogy is imbricated in ideology" ("Rhetoric," 492). Likewise, rejecting the "possibility of 
objective knowledge" (40), John Clifford argues, 
Marx, like other humanists, believed that insight into the 
exploitative class struggle would eventually allow individuals to 
locate the real through the distorting fog of ideology. Althuser, 
however [with whom Clifford agrees], destigmatizes ideology as 
natural and inevitable as ineluctably woven into everything we do; 
consequently it cannot simply be expunged. (41) 
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People are always occupying subject positions. And Amy Lee in Composing Critical 
Pedagogies published in 2000 quotes Foucault to have said that "something called Power,.. 
. which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist" 
(This is from Foucault, 1982,788). She concludes: 
We might, then, envision our classes as serving not to empower 
individual writers, but as forums for recognizing and analyzing 
when we, as writers, readers, teachers, or students, exercise 
power, for making power (like language) a focus of study rather 
simply a commodity to be produced and/or exchanged. When 
teachers claim their primary goal is to 'empower my students' or 
to 'empower my students as writers,' I often wonder, why? Is the 
end, the final hope, to produce better writers? More powerful 
students'? (165) 
I respect the work of poststructuralist critical theorists. Kenneth Bruffee expresses 
his commitment to the role of teachers as "agents of change" (650) when he argues for the 
need to permit and encourage "abnormal discourse" in the classroom. Berlin believes the 
"transformative intellectual" ("Literacy, 254) should be committed to "democratic practices 
in all areas of experience." And Lee argues that poststructuralism's "concentrating on 
language as discourse means attending not merely to the structural characteristics of language 
practice, but to social relationships and practices, to material conditions" (159). I, too, 
consider concepts such as ideology, subjectivity, and discourse and their refinements in 
poststructuralism to be positive developments, especially as Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu 
use those terms under the unifying concept of "practice." But poststructuralism also 
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represents a serious inattention to the critical link between, on the one hand, "discursive 
practices" and, on the other, "social relationships and practices" and "material conditions." 
Problems of Knowledge in Poststructuralism 
This inattention of poststructuralism has debilitating consequences for critical and 
liberatory theories such as cultural studies, which according to Chris Barker in Cultural 
Studies: Theory and Practice, has the explicit goal of connecting "matters of power and 
politics, to the need for change and to representations of and 'for' marginalized social 
groups" (5). Cultural studies, Barker explains, has been heavily influenced by 
poststructuralism and aims to achieve its emancipatory political goals while recognizing, for 
example, that "meaning is unstable, being always deferred and in process.... [and] is the 
outcome of relationships between texts" (18). Cultural studies also accepts the 
postructuralist rejection of the claim that "a degree of certain knowledge about an 
independent object world (a real world) is possible" (26). In a Reader's Guide to 
Contemporary Literary Theory, Raman Selden writes that poststructuralists abandon the 
structuralist project of opening the secrets of the text because there are "unconscious, or 
linguistic, or historical forces which cannot be mastered" (109). These forces show that "The 
signifier floats away from the signified." What this floating amounts to is what Barker calls 
the "rejection of a universal objective truth . .. based on the impossibility of word-world 
correspondence and therefore of accurate or adequate representation" (30). These positions 
of poststructuralism are, of course, in sharp contrast with basic premises of CP as formulated 
by, for example, Freire.9 But the positions also seem self-contradictory. For example, after 
rejecting "universal objective truth," Barker claims that cultural studies is in "search of 
improvements to the human condition" (29). But what is this human condition and its 
problems? Or he recommends the use of a "tape recorder to document" interviews because 
such use allows us to "understand the words of others for practical purposes" and "to predict 
the actions of others" (30). But how did these consequences follow? Where lies the 
difference between understanding what others say and making it up? Or between imagining 
people's actions and predicting them? I will examine these inconsistencies in the context of 
analyzing Stanley Fish's essay "Rhetoric." But before I get to that examination, I would like 
to take a close look at the steps a poststructuralist cultural theorist has to take to arrive at 
these inconsistencies. 
Key Problem with Hall's Explanation of Representation 
In examining the cultural studies textbook Representation: Cultural Representation 
and Signifying Practices by Stuart Hall, a prominent cultural theorist, I am following the 
approach recommended by John Searle, who in Mind, Language, and Society suggests that 
often "we can find out more about what is going on in a culture by looking at undergraduate 
textbooks than by looking at the work of more prestigious thinkers. The textbooks are less 
clever at concealment" (20). Of course, I don't accuse Hall of intentional concealment. But 
I agree with the implied claim in Searle's statement that textbooks cannot pretend that the 
common-sense assumptions of their readers do not exist and have to respond to those 
9 
"Any situation in which 'A' objectively exploits 'B'... is one of oppression" (Freire, 37). 
assumptions. I have chosen a work by Stuart Hall because he does not get carried away in 
what Terry Eagleton calls the "scandalous" obscurity of many works of radical cultural 
theory. 
In Representation Hall writes that "culture is about 'shared meanings'" (1) and that 
"Representation connects meaning and language to culture" (15). But what is 
representation? He writes, "representation is the production of the meaning of the concepts 
in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language, which enables 
us to refer to either the 'real' world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary 
worlds of fictional objects, people and events" (17). Hall's explanation of representation 
consists of three stages of claims that build a contradictory or meaningless conclusion. The 
problem arises from two sources: Hall (a) introduces concepts whose implications he ignores 
when convenient and (b) overextends a generalization. Before I begin, I should mention that 
Hall briefly acknowledges this problem. Saussure, Hall writes, "gave little or no attention to 
how this relation between signifier/signified could serve the purpose of what earlier we 
called reference—i.e. referring us to the world of things, people and events outside language 
in the 'real' world" (34). But Hall does not pursue the extremely far-reaching—as I will 
argue, paralyzing—implications of Saussure's giving "little or no attention" to the relation 
between the sign and the referent. 
In the first stage, Hall writes that "all sorts of objects, people, and events are 
correlated with a set of concepts or mental representations which we carry in our heads" 
(17). He calls this set of concepts the first system of representation (17), which is a system 
because it does not merely consist of "individual concepts, but of different ways of 
organizing, clustering, arranging, and classifying concepts, and of establishing complex 
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relations between them" (17). He identifies some of those "principles of organization" (18): 
"classifying according to sequence—which concept follows which—or causality—what 
causes what—and so on" (18). At this stage, he does not offer any explanation of the nature 
of those mental representations. For example, why do we have something called "principles 
of organization?" Or why do we have the principles of organization of sequence and 
causality and not some other alternatives? 
In the second stage, he establishes the connection between the first system of 
representation and the second, which is "a common language" (18). He concludes that "the 
relation between 'things', concepts and signs lies at the heart of the production of meaning in 
language" (19). Here Hall explains that the relationship between spoken and written 
signifiers and the signifieds is arbitrary, that is, we can, as the speakers of any language, 
agree on using a word other than TREE to refer to a large plant, as users of other languages 
do indeed use a different word. He concludes, however, that therefore, in "indexical systems 
of representation [spoken and written language], the relationship between the sign, the 
concept, and the object to which they might be used to refer is entirely arbitrary" (21). This 
sweeping generalization is entirely unwarranted and extremely revealing because Hall has 
only established the claim that the choice of linguistic symbols for referring to concepts is 
arbitrary. This claim is not seriously disputed by anyone because it is a rather 
inconsequential observation. The claim does not establish the further—and if established, 
then truly groundbreaking—claim that the relationship between our mental concepts (also 
signs) and objects are arbitrary. In fact, there is strong evidence supporting the reverse. For 
example, historical linguistics makes a strong case for the claim that although a certain word 
for a certain concept may shed that concept and adopt another or drop out of the language 
altogether, the concept usually finds another word to represent it. For example, C. M. 
Millward in A Biography of the English Language writes that in Old English "smierwan 
meant 'anoint, salve, smear.' With the advent of the French loan anoint, smear came to have 
connotations of crudeness and even contempt. Certainly today we could not speak seriously 
of a bishop's smearing someone's head with oil" (210). The point is the idea (concept) of 
what today we call anoint remains even if the word originally referring to it has changed. At 
any rate, the important point here is that what Hall says about arbitrariness of the signifier 
and the signified in indexical systems of representation (his second system) does not say 
anything, one way or another, about the arbitrariness of the relationship between the signified 
and the referent (his first system). 
In preparation for the third stage of the explanation, Hall writes that "the meaning is 
constructed and fixed by the code, which sets up the correlation between our conceptual 
system and our language system in such a way that, every time we think of a tree, the code 
tells us to use the English word TREE, or the French word ARBRE" (21). "Codes," he 
writes, "fix the relationships between concepts and signs" (21). "One implication of this 
argument about cultural codes," he writes, "is that, if meaning is the result, not of something 
fixed out there, in nature, but of our social, cultural and linguistic conventions, then meaning 
can never be finally fixed" (23). The un-fixedness of meaning is a cornerstone of cultural 
studies, which uses the flexibility of meaning to argue that existing, unjust social relations are 
not based on any finally irremovable foundations. 
In the third stage of his argument, Hall draws further unwarranted conclusions about 
the nature of the first system of representation. He quotes Culler as saying, "'Not only does 
each language produce a different set of signifiers, articulating and dividing the continuum of 
sound (or writing or drawing or photography) in a distinctive way; each language produces a 
different set of signifieds; it has a distinctive and thus arbitrary way of organizing the world 
into concepts and categories "' (32, emphasis mine). In this third stage, the organization and 
categorization of the world is attributed to socially constructed, shared and arbitrary codes. 
This statement contradicts Hall's earlier claim from which he had begun his analysis: 
namely, that the concepts organizing and categorizing the world come from the first system 
of representation. In the third stage, it turns out (or rather, it is unproblematically stated) that 
the concepts (and "principles of organization") in the first system of representation actually 
come from the second system of representation. 
Aside from contradicting his earlier statements, Hall's explanation is deeply flawed, 
for, among other reasons, his theory of representation is based on a self-contradictory 
definition of signs. According to Hall, mental concepts that organize our perceptions are 
produced by the codes that speakers of a language use to communicate those concepts, that 
is, the codes "produce" the very concepts that the codes signify, that is, codes signify 
themselves. As quoted previously, construct!vists like Hall believe that "It is because a 
particular sound or word stands for, symbolizes or represents a concept that it can function, 
in language, as a sign and convey meaning—or, as the constructionists say, signify (sign-i-
fy)" (25,26). In other words, as a constructivist like Hall explicitly believes, the idea of 
"standing for" is built into the definition of "sign," "signification," and therefore, "meaning." 
Thus, Hall's theory of representation is based on a definition of signs that is literally 
meaningless. Or in effect, Hall is in effect arguing that there is no such thing as meaning. I 
don't think arriving at this conclusion has been Hall's intention, nor do I believe that he 
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would be interested in arriving at his idea of the ultimate impermanence of meanings at the 
cost of theoretical incoherence. 
A close look at Hall's arguments in Representation also shows why Hall re-states 
Hume's problem (that there is an unbridgeable gap between the mind—symbols—and the 
external world) almost exactly when he states, "I regard the extradiscursive as a kind of 
wager. It's a kind of bet that the world exists, which cannot be proven in a philosophical 
sense" ("Reflections," 267-268). This view, shared by structuralism and its later 
formulations, relies heavily on an interpretation of Saussure's linguistics. Important 
observations and arguments against this interpretation are offered by Pierre Bourdieu and 
Barbara Hernstein Smith. According to Bourdieu, Saussure makes a two part move to arrive 
at the form of his scientific project: (1) he considers speech as the precondition of language 
but (2) he takes this priority of speech over language to be "purely chronological" and inverts 
"the relationship" between speech and language by leaving "the domain of individual or 
collective history in order to inquire into the logical conditions for deciphering" (23-24). 
Thus, language becomes "the precondition for the intelligibility of speech" (24). In the 
process, "from the strictly intellectualist standpoint of deciphering, Saussurian linguistics 
privileges the structure of signs, that is, the relations between them, at the expense of the 
practical functions" (24). Hernstein Smith calls the Saussurean move an instance of "Verbal 
animism, or the tendency to confuse the contingent effects of verbal forms with forces 
inherent in the forms themselves" (56). 
Despite the problems to which Bourdieu and Hernstein Smith point, I consider 
Saussure's strategy of bracketing practices of language and focusing on its structure to be 
perfectly legitimate. Focusing on structure of language is as legitimate as focusing on 
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anatomy (say, as opposed to physiology) in biology. Saussure's choice was legitimate given 
the problems he meant to solve. But extending this strategic bracketing into a thoroughgoing 
Humean skepticism does not work for a theorist such as Hall who does want to say things 
about the social and cultural world. Similar, but more telling, poststructuralist misreadings 
are at work when Hall writes that Foucault rejects "any criterion of 'truth' in the human 
sciences in favour of the idea of a 'regime of truth' and the will-to-power (the will to make 
things 'true') " (51). But Foucault, given his research goals, brackets the issue of standards 
of truth in his works. In Fearless Speech, he explains that what he has 
tried to do from the beginning was to analyze the process of 
'problematization'—which means: how and why certain things 
(behavior, phenomena, processes) became a problem.... when I 
say that I am studying the 'problematization' of madness, crime, or 
sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. 
On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real 
existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a 
given moment.... For I think there is a relation between the thing 
which is problematized and the process of problematization. The 
problematization is an 'answer' to a concrete situation which is real. 
.. .There is a relation of thought and reality in the process of 
problematization. And that is... why ... it is possible to give an 
analysis of a specific problematization as the history of an answer— 
the original, specific, and singular answer of thought—to a certain 
situation. (171-173) 
I will return to the centrality of the issue of problematization later in the essay. But I 
end by noting that Hall's perspective on Foucault permits him to see the interactions of 
signifying systems and regimes of truth, but not standards of truth. In the last analysis, the 
status of Foucault's truth claims must remain a mystery to Hall. Despite acknowledging 
Foucault's emphasis on the concept of practice, Hall continues to reframe Foucault's work in 
terms of the Humean gap between the mind (thought processes and systems of signification) 
and the world. This gap, as I will argue later, is a telltale sign of residual objectivist thinking. 
Objectivism of Stanley Fish 
Another influential theorist whose work reflects residual objectivist thinking is 
Stanley Fish. Fish's attacks on the concepts of objectivity and truth have received a good 
deal of hearing in English Studies, especially in my field of rhetoric. For example, The 
Rhetorical Tradition ends with an essay by Stanley Fish entitled "Rhetoric." And Patricia 
Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg end their introductory section on Fish by writing, "Fish's roll 
call of the heroes of the interpretive turn is a helpful summary of the central theme of 
twentieth-century rhetorical theory" (1608). I would certainly agree that the theme 
mentioned is central. But the summary is also helpful in that it includes a gross mistreatment 
of that theme. If Bizzell and Herzberg think the essay is a helpful summary, then the essay 
should be able to serve as a point of departure for examining a few debilitating confusions in 
contemporary rhetorical theory about the definition, ingredients, scope, and function of 
rhetoric. In this section, I will compare the far-flung conclusions that Fish draws from his 
understanding of the collapse of the traditional epistemology with the rather panicked 
conclusions that have been drawn from Nietzsche's works. Thus I will also closely analyze a 
short work by Nietzsche to show that despite the tremendous importance of his ideas, he has 
not undermined the very idea of the possibility of truth and objectivity. He has merely 
shown the untenability of certain characterizations of those concepts. 
In "Rhetoric" Fish repeatedly and rightly insists that there has been a long-standing 
debate going on between rhetoric10 and philosophy: "I only wish to point out that the debate 
continues to this very day that that its terms are exactly those one finds in the dialogues of 
Plato and the orations of the sophists" (1617). And he frames his arguments in terms of the 
first appearance of that debate in ancient Greece between Plato and Aristotle on the one hand 
and the sophists on the other. He points out quite correctly that debate resulted in a "win" for 
the Plato and Aristotle side. He traces variations of the same debate in different periods, for 
example, during Restoration in England and among the members of the Vienna Circle 
between World Wars. 
Fish presents the view of foundationalist anti-rhetoricians or philosophers as people 
who want to communicate in ways that escape "partiality" and who want to determine and 
then affirm "what is absolutely and objectivity true" (1611). Antirhetoricians want to remove 
from language superfluities, equivocations, metaphors, ambiguity, redundancy, and 
indirection (1612) to prevent the creation of "wayward" thoughts. They want "plain 
unvarnished truth straightforwardly presented" (1613). Anti-rhetoricians also see divisions 
in the soul and contrast carnality with spirituality in the soul and passion with reason (1612). 
In the anti-rhetorical stance, the premise is that "any discourse must be measured against a 
1 0 1  s h o u l d  m e n t i o n  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s a m e  i n t e r p r e t i v e  t u r n  i n  p h i l o s o p h y ,  t h e  t e r m  rhetoric is 
contested. So when Fish and other theorists say "rhetoric is ...what they mean is "rhetoric should be 
d e f i n e d  o r  t h o u g h t  o f  a s  . . . "  
stable and independent reality" (1615). According to Fish, the most influential proponents of 
the foundationalist approach are Plato and Aristotle. More recent theorists that Fish cites are 
Noam Chomsky, John Searle, and Jtirgen Habermas. 
So what exactly is rhetoric according to Fish? He writes that rhetoric is "passionate 
partisan discourse" (1611), and communication is "partial," not "absolutely and objectively 
true" (1611). Rhetoric is for the "powerful but insidious appeal of 'fine language,' language 
that has transgressed the limits of representation and substituted its own forms for the forms 
of reality" (1613). Rhetoric gives the probable, or "what is likely to be so given particular 
conditions within some local perspective" (1614), more importance than the true. This 
position respects only "accidental as opposed to essential being.... the conditional and 
relative as opposed to the self-existent" (1614). Thus, Fish writes, true and good are context 
dependent, and there is "no master context... from the vantage point of which the 
differences could be assessed and judged" (1614). Since rhetoric is concerned with 
producing "belief and therefore ... what, in a particular time and particular place, is true, [it] 
is the skill essential to the building and maintaining of a civilized society" (1614). In a 
defense of deconstructive thought, which Fish calls "supremely rhetorical" (1621), he writes, 
deconstruction "systematically asserts and demonstrates the mediated, constructed, partial, 
socially constituted nature of all realities, whether they be phenomenal, linguistic, or 
psychological." Derrida's deconstruction in particular denies "the possibility of a general 
theory—of an account that is itself more than an extension of some particular context or 
perspective." 
These are also teasingly vague. 
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What is meant by "passionate partisan discourse"? Does rejection of Platonism say 
anything one way or other about more or less trustworthy/reliable statements (truths)? But 
then what do trustworthy and reliable mean? Is deconstruction a theory? Is the statement 
"deconstruction denies 'the possibility of a general theory'" not a general theory? What does 
it mean that language transgresses the limits of representation and "substitute [s] its own 
forms for the forms of reality"? Why is the narrow local perspective to be privileged over 
the general or universal perspective? Is not rhetoric's respect for the "accidental as opposed 
to essential being" an acceptance of the Platonic categories to begin with? 
Fish's views become clearer in his discussion of McCloskey and Kuhn. Fish defends 
McCloskey's claim that "'assertions are made for purposes of persuading some audience' 
and that, given the unavailability of a God's-eye view, 'this is not a shameful fact,' but the 
bottom line fact in a rhetorical world' (1618). Fish then claims McCloskey's view is 
comparable to that propounded by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which 
according to Fish, argues "there is no principled (i.e., nonrhetorical) way to adjudicate the 
dispute" between competing observations made from different set of "tacit assumptions and 
beliefs" (or paradigms). Fish believes that Kuhn's position means that 
science does not proceed by offering its descriptions to the 
independent judgment of nature; rather, it proceeds when the 
proponents of one paradigm are able to present their case in a way 
that the adherents of other paradigms find compelling. In short, the 
"motor" by which science moves is not verification or falsification, 
but persuasion. Indeed, says Kuhn, in the end the force of scientific 
argument "is only that of persuasion" (p. 94). (1618) 
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When there are disagreements, the highest standard is the agreement of the "relevant 
community" (1618). Thus, Fish writes we have no access to neutral language, or neutral 
facts, 
the report on the world as it is seen from within some particular 
situation; there is no other aperspectival way to see and no language 
other than a situation-dependent language—an interested, rhetorical 
language—in which to report. (1619) 
From all this, Fish concludes that Kuhn's position leaves us "in a world of 
epistemological and moral anarchy"(1619). But how did Fish end up in "a world of 
epistemological and moral anarchy"? Kuhn certainly does not think science is in crisis. In 
"Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice" (published 1977), he writes, nothing he 
has argued rejects canons or criteria of scientific discovery, which are of paramount 
importance for determining the adequacy of a theory: "accuracy, consistency, scope, 
simplicity, and fruitfulness" (278). But since there are levels of accuracy and sometimes the 
criteria may be in conflict (for example, a theory may be more accurate than another but less 
consistent with previous theories), he writes (say in abnormal science, which involves 
different paradigms) "one must go beyond the list of shared criteria to characteristics of the 
individuals who make the choice" (280). Individual history of past experience in a field, 
historical conditions, and prevalent political views may dispose scientists to choose one 
theory as opposed to another, "without thereby in the least jeopardizing their adherence to the 
canons that make science scientific." In other words, as mentioned on the same page quoted 
by Fish, 
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To discover how scientific revolutions are effected, we shall 
therefore have to examine not only the impact of nature and of 
logic, but also the techniques of persuasive argumentation effective 
within the quite special groups that constitute the community of 
scientists. (94) 
Thus, sometimes the values that scientists have already agreed on and turned into 
standards and rules are no longer sufficient, and scientists have to engage in arguments that 
involve not application, but assessment, of those and other values. I think Fish's sense of 
anarchy comes from his tacit acceptance of positivism or objectivism. That is, he thinks that 
science—the supposed paradigm of rationality—should concern itself merely with 
discovering facts, because values cannot be rationally assessed (more on this towards the end 
of the paper). Fish is not entirely at fault here: the details, the significance, and the all-
pervasive implications of the topic of the rational assessment of values are not well known in 
the western philosophical tradition because of the long-standing framework of Aristotelian 
epistemology. 
Fish's reaction to Kuhn's arguments about paradigms and truth is reminiscent of the 
panicked reaction of many thinkers in the 19th century to Nietzsche's sustained and 
comprehensive challenges to objectivism and positivism. Nietzsche foresaw the complete 
collapse of Aristotelian epistemology (objectivism) and metaphysics (theology), and he 
anticipated the onset of nihilism in Europe. His philosophical work is an attempt at 
completing that collapse and to see if a new goal and approach to life can be envisaged. I am 
going to outline some of Nietzsche's arguments in "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense" because they can help clarify the problems I see in Fish's position on rhetoric. This is 
an early essay in Nietzsche's body of work (1873), but it lays the foundation for his later 
explorations of some old themes in philosophy and especially in moral theory. The essay is a 
systematic and unforgiving attack on the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical projects. 
Nietzsche begins with a series of truth claims about the world: Humans are in a life-
and-death struggle for self-preservation. Physical weakness has strengthened their powers of 
cunning and dissimulation. They wish to live socially out of boredom and need. To live 
socially, they create a "universally valid and binding designation for things" (1172). Original 
laws of truth come from this universalizing function of language. Humans care about the 
truth only as long as it helps preserve them or give them pleasure (1173). 
He then turns his attention to Plato and Aristotle and argues against their position that 
words and language are "not congruent with things" (1173). Nietzsche is referring to and 
rejecting Aristotle's belief that Humans have a "faculty" called mind, which is of the same 
stuff (or form or essence) as the stuff (or form or essence) of reality. This mind (subject), 
according to Aristotle, can know, grasp, or become one or merge with reality (object). 
Against that view, Nietzsche states that language is not "the adequate expression of all 
realities" (1173). There is no "'truth' of the grade" (1173) Aristotle stipulates. In other 
words, against the Aristotelian view that the forms or essences of reality can be "defined" in 
words by the mind through a process of classification and exclusion {ratio), Nietzsche argues 
that the true state of affairs in the world does not designate our words, which show a 
remarkable set of arbitrary categories and differentiation within (e.g., gender for nouns in 
German) and among languages, "first for this, then for that property of a thing" (1173). 
From this, Nietzsche moves to adopt a Kantian view of knowledge (which he elaborates 
104 
later) to the effect that we do not know the Kantian '"thing in itself" (1173) or reality as it 
really is (without perspective and without a knowing mind). 
So what do we know? Nietzsche claims we know words in their relation "to men" 
(1173). We also know the effects of things. He calls those effects metaphors (1173) or 
impressions (1175) or images (1173) or illusions (1174). Thus, he writes—and here is 
Nietzsche's very scientific theory—"To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an 
image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor" (1173). 
It is, he writes, like a totally deaf person who sees sand figures created by "vibrations of the 
string" and exclaims he now knows what "sound" means (1173-1174). Likewise, we think 
we know trees and colors, but all we know are "metaphors," which do not really correspond 
"to the original entities" (1174), here "original entities" being his rephrasing of Kant's "thing 
in itself." In other words, Nietzsche considers and rejects an early version of the 
correspondence theory of truth as visual representation (or isomorphism), not as a formal 
requirement of true statements about the world. His conclusion from all this is another 
chipping away at objectivism: "Thus if scientists do not quite make up things from thin air," 
they at least do not create them from "the essence of things" (1174). 
Nietzsche offers another argument against objectivism. He writes, words are created 
from removing distinguishing differences among items (say, millions of leaves) and 
designating the "similarities" (1174). He notes in passing that this activity of the mind is the 
source of the misguided Platonic and Aristotelian idealism. Nietzsche returns to Kant's 
views on the "thing in itself' and concludes that nature has no forms, no concepts, and no 
species (he is talking Aristotelian genera and species), "only an X which remains inaccessible 
and undefinable for us" (1174). 
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So again, what grade of truth is accessible to us? Nietzsche writes truth seems to be 
merely imaginative effects (metaphors or illusions) transformed through our human 
perceptual apparatuses, which after long "usage" become "fixed, canonical and binding" 
(1174), that is, we forget they are metaphors or imaginative effects. To use the usual 
metaphors (that is, "fixed conventions") is to tell the truth. These views, of course, do not in 
any way reject scientific knowledge once it has been detached from its dogmatic Aristotelian 
justifications. Science does not aim to define essences. Definitions in science are 
operational. Science is interested in identifying regularity and similarities in nature. It 
purposely seeks out "anomalies" to explain them in terms of what is known and regular. 
He writes, given this long usage, humans in different societies create a "schemata" of 
universal (socially shared) concepts and create a "pyramidal order" that is regular, classified, 
and logical, a "new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked 
boundaries" (1175). Here truth means "never violating the order of caste and class rank" 
(1175). 
Our knowledge is of this form: we "make up" a definition, say, mammals; then we 
inspect an animal, say, a camel, and declare the camel to be a mammal. Nietzsche writes, 
this is "indeed truth," but "of limited value" (1175) because it is "a thoroughly 
anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would be 'true in itself or 
really and universally valid apart from man" (1175). We think when an "image" (impression 
or effect) has been repeated through many generations "on the same occasion every time for 
all of mankind" that the relationship between "the original nerve stimulus to the generated 
image" is causal (1176). This may be a form of knowing, but it does not satisfy Plato's idea 
of knowledge. 
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Finally, the regularity is there only because "all of mankind" has the "same sense 
perception" (1176). Thus, we know no laws of nature, only its effects in terms only of what 
we bring to them (as Kant argues): "time and space, and therefore relationships of 
succession and number" (1177). 
The central theme of Nietzsche's argument is anthropomorphism. Aristotle and Plato 
claimed to have discovered a "moral universe," a universe that is infused with values. They 
believed what humans think they value may not match the values of Reality unless they come 
to know or to Reason (as Plato and Aristotle define knowledge and Reason). If they do, they 
will see that what is good and what is true converge. In effect, the effort was geared at 
removing intractable value judgements. Nietzsche argues that there is no basis whatever for 
this world picture. The universe itself does not have any values one way or other. We cannot 
know anything without infusing it with our human capacities, needs, and activities, in other 
words, with human values. But he has a genuine suspicion that the human in this picture if 
seen outside the conventional (and ignorant) schemata humans have built to describe 
themselves and the world, may be "pitiless, greedy, insatiable, and murderous" (1172), that 
in other words, humans (presumably like Nietzsche), if they come to a clearer understanding 
of their condition, may see that they are "hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger." 
I don't sense this fear in the complacent arguments of Stanley Fish. His prose, 
despite its purported openness to "partisan, passionate discourse," strikes me as expressing 
more nervousness of a game player than genuine distress. Thinkers like Plato and Nietzsche 
seem to be more aware of and concerned about the brutality of human history and the depths 
to which humans sink to resolve their differences and fulfill their desires: invasion, 
enslavement, torture, execution, degradation, oppression, etc. over generations. So 
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Nietzsche wants to understand the tiger better without relying exclusively on how the tiger 
describes itself. The tiger is acting according to urges (needs or drives, which are forms of 
basic value) that are nearly beyond its ken and control, its will to power (to life), its desire to 
control a portion of its environment, etc. In the process, it does (and says) what it has to do; 
for example, it forgets that the metaphors it has built around itself are mere metaphors, that 
is, it lies to itself. In his other works, Nietzsche attempts to peel away those metaphors. 
Of course, Nietzsche's arguments presuppose certain theories about how the world is, 
knowledge and truth, suffering, human needs and drives, something called "will to power," 
etc. Those theories in turn presuppose external realism as a framework of intelligibility. 
And at least in this essay, he seems to have difficulty detaching himself from the static 
Aristotelian world picture. In other words, he does not quite appreciate the suggestion 
implicit in his views: that humans are already in the world engaged in activities. 
Nietzsche and philosophers after him take the idea of the "will to power" seriously. 
They do not declare that knowledge is a mask for power; they want to know whether 
knowledge is a mask for power. At the very least, they want to know the relationship 
between knowledge and power (Again, will to power is a drive, that is, a basic value). 
So for example, undertaking a Nietzshean project of peeling away, Foucault in The 
Order of Discourse looks at discourse as an activity or practice (something people do) and 
identifies three sets of procedures that control, restrict, and exclude discourse: (1) "the 
forbidden speech, the division of madness, and the will to truth" (1463); (2) the definition 
and "fecundity" of the author, "the multiplicity of commentaries," and "the development of a 
discipline" (1467); and (3) "speech-rituals, societies of discourse, doctrinal groups, and social 
appropriations" (1469). The truth claims Foucault makes about the constraints on discourse 
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are part of a larger project of identifying and peeling away layers of metaphor making up our 
Nitzschean conventional schemata, which seem perfectly natural and "true." The ultimate 
goal of Foucault is a better understanding of the intersection of knowledge and power. 
And despite what Fish might think, it is not just continental philosophers who take the 
Nietzschean "suspicion" seriously. Contemporary analytic philosophers and philosophers of 
science are also in agreement. For example, In Construction of Social Reality, John Searle 
mentions some of the problems that confront what we can know: 
vagueness, indeterminacy, family resemblance, open texture, 
contextual dependency, the incommensurability of theories, 
ambiguity, the idealization involved in theory construction, 
alternative interpretations, the underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, and all the rest of it. (167) 
However, philosophers such as Searle also note that the debunking of the Platonic 
theory of knowledge by philosophers such as Nietzsche has merely discredited "a 
misconception of the relationship between truth and reality" (175). As I will try to show later 
in this essay, the main contemporary currents of philosophy have long adopted the main 
arguments of Nietzsche. In the next section, I will try to show that from arguments similar to 
Nietzsche's, Fish's far-flung conclusions cannot be drawn. 
Stanley Fish's formulation of the development of rhetoric suffers from several 
shortcomings. I will mention and respond to them briefly. First, in rejecting the 
Platonic/Aristotelian epistemological solutions, Fish also rejects the problems they were 
trying to solve, namely the possibility and practice of deception in discourse. This is a 
serious mistake that much more thoroughgoing, doggedly consistent thinkers like Nietzsche 
and Foucault do not make. Experiences of mistake, deception, and self-deception are 
commonplace phenomena and practices of human life. Fish is making a mistake along the 
lines of confusing the theory of gravity and forces of attraction among bodies for the 
experience of gravity. This mistake is connected to a second: Fish thinks the only type of 
knowledge to be had is contingent and context based. Deconstructive thought, which Fish 
calls "supremely rhetorical" (1621) "systematically asserts and demonstrates the mediated, 
constructed, partial, socially constituted nature of all realities, whether they be phenomenal, 
linguistic, or psychological." Elsewhere he defends Derrida's deconstruction for denying 
"the possibility of a general theory—of an account that is itself more than an extension of 
some particular context of perspective." A rather glaring problem with these statements is 
that they are (a) extremely broad general theoretical statements that (b) deny the possibility 
of making general theoretical statements. The self-contradictory character of this thesis by 
Fish is also noted by David Detmer in Challenging Postmodernism: Philosophy and the 
Politics of Truth. Detmer quotes Fish as having written, "the mechanisms of persuasion, like 
everything else, are context-specific" (quoted in Detmer, 249). In response, Detmer asks, "Is 
this dictum itself context-specific?" (249-50). Of course in a sense everything happens in 
some context or other. But Fish draws conclusions from this observation that simply do not 
follow because contexts can be large or small, and they in part depend on our activities and 
the direction of our thoughts. For example, I am a member of a small family, but I am also a 
member of a large land-grant university community. Am I a member of the one or the other? 
Of course, the answer is both. Fish ignores such situations and arbitrarily focuses on small 
contexts, which he then arbitrarily declares to be completely incommensurable. But there 
are some very large contexts, so large in fact to qualify as universal, earth for example with 
its gravity, air, rotation, etc. Nietzsche notes that all our knowledge is anthropomorphic; 
some characteristics of life he notes apply to "all of mankind." Moreover, people can have 
multiple perspectives on an issue from different contexts. As mentioned, we do not fill out 
only one context; we do several, and we connect them intellectually and physically. We can 
have outsider perspectives without being outside all context; for example, we can climb a hill 
and get a broader view of a landscape or a road without thereby thinking that we have exited 
all context or that we are looking at the world from the viewpoint of God. Moreover, some 
perspectives are better than others given the task at hand. Thus, a sweeping rejection of the 
possibility of the usefulness of examining issues and claims from broad contexts seems 
unjustified. 
Third Fish believes that the debunking of the Aristotelian epistemology has somehow 
brought in its wake "epistemological and moral anarchy." I believe that view reflects 
residual positivistic thinking. At best Fish has shown us that our old paradigm of rationality 
has been shown to be inadequate to the task of helping us decide between competing value-
infused beliefs. From that proposition, he concludes that we have no choice but to live and 
think under the banner of irrationality. But that conclusion accepts the way the old paradigm 
defines rationality. The paradigm offers Fish an either/or dilemma. Either we have a 
rational, value-infused world and rationality is our knowledge of this world, or we have 
nothing but chaos and irrationality. Fish, first rejects the paradigm but then forgets that he 
has rejected the paradigm and accepts the "or" part of the dilemma. His position is merely a 
corollary of objectivism, the very view he claims to be rejecting. 
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Finally, Fish simply refuses to get into the details of his interpretive community. His 
discovery that evaluation happens (standards are set or found) in the context of the relevant 
and qualified interpretive community is not new. Karl Popper and other philosophers of 
science have discussed this issue for some time now. Popper's re-definition of objectivity as 
inter subjectivity is precisely a recognition of the community-based or social character of 
science. The question is and has always revolved around the values of the community, how 
they are arrived at, and how they are related to the values of other communities, some of 
which may be occupied by some or all of the same participants in the first community, and 
some of which may have been occupied by people in the past. For example, there may be 
important connections between the values of biologists now and those of 150 years ago. Fish 
may be surprised at the commonalities among those communities; he may also be surprised 
to find out that the differences may be perfectly within our ability to understand. By placing 
the responsibility for standards of judgement on the community, Fish has merely pushed the 
question of how those standards of judgment are arrived at one step back. The question can 
be asked in a slightly different way: How does the community arrive at those standards? 
Even foundationalist philosophers, when seen from Fish's perspective, can be argued to have 
always been arguing for standards in the relevant community without emphasizing the 
community aspect of their arguments. The issue of "the relevant community" was not 
considered worth exploring by those thinkers. But for all practical purposes they were 
arguing for what their community should have accepted as standards. Fish's insight that 
what applies to one community may not apply to another is worth exploring. But his failure 
to appreciate the necessity of taking the further step of arguing for those standards is an 
unqualified setback for scholarship. Fish extends his problematic reliance on community as 
the source of values in judgement to a much more problematic reliance on culture. 
Fish's views have broad implications for politics, activism, and critical pedagogy. In 
After Theory, Terry Eagleton points out that Fish's arguments against theory are ultimately 
rooted in a characterization of a broad conceptualization of community that Fish calls culture. 
So according to Fish, theories are supposed to give us "fundamental reasons" for our way of 
life (54). But Fish argues that this mediating function of theory is untenable. Rather, "What 
counts as a legitimate reason or a valid idea will be determined for you by your way of life 
itself' (54). Eagleton calls this a new version offideism, the idea that "your life is based on 
certain beliefs which are immune to rational scrutiny" (55). A consequence of viewing 
culture in this way is that it permits "no rational grounds forjudging between cultures." Our 
judgements are always made from within our cultures, not "from a disinterested point outside 
it." Eagleton is quick to note the supposed advantage that this view seems to offer. Since 
our beliefs are rooted in culture and "culture has no solid basis," those beliefs become 
contingent. This view seems to open possibilities for political intervention because it seems 
to promise that there are no absolute foundations for things in society being the way they are. 
Eagleton notes that the anti-theoretical view fails to account for human phenomena that go 
beyond cultural boundaries, for example, "grief, compassion, right-angled triangles or the 
concept of something being the case" (56). He also notes that anti-theorists would have to 
make implausible arguments to justify, for example, why they would oppose torture if torture 
is a cultural phenomena like playing tennis. Anti-theorists would say the reasons for 
opposing torture are also contingent and have "nothing to do with the way human beings are, 
since human beings are no way in particular." Pushing Fish to confront the implications of 
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his views on torture, Eagleton writes, Fish may have to admit that his culture happens to 
oppose extracting confessions from people by "holding their heads down in water," but other 
cultures may not oppose this technique, and if so "then more power to ... [their] elbow" 
(57). To avoid this position, Fish's position leaves him no room but to move to the other 
extreme and reject torture by frankly admitting that his position is a form of cultural 
imperialism. In Fish's view, "Moral values, like everything else, are a matter of random, 
free-floating cultural traditions" (57). Noting that we have been since Nietzsche 
systematically eroding the metaphysical underpinnings of epistemology, Eagleton argues that 
Fish makes the mistake of replacing "one kind of anchoring with another. It is now culture, 
not God or Nature, which is the foundation of the world" (58). Although culture seems less 
stable than previous Nature, God, or Reason (as defined by Plato and Aristotle), nevertheless, 
members of the kind of culture Fish invokes cannot "peer outside it" (59) and "what we 
would see if we could peer beyond it would itself be determined by the culture." In this 
view, culture does become a bottom line, albeit a "bumpy" one. This Culture is just as 
inevitable as previously Nature was. Eagleton also argues that Fish seems to be working 
with a rather monolithic as well as hermetic conception of culture. But of course, people 
from different cultures interact. I was raised in Iran but have lived most of my life in the 
United States. I cannot unproblematically appeal to some cultural values of Iran or of the 
United States to make sense of my world. As postcolonial theory emphasizes, this condition 
is perhaps far more widespread than the condition of the person who has been born and 
raised in a hermetic and monolithic cultural environment. Moreover, the values and 
traditions within a single culture are by no means entirely coherent. An Iowa student born 
and raised on a farm will have conflicting concerns to a range of cultural traditions, values, 
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and allegiances. As John Searle in Rationality in Action argues even what a single person at a 
moment in his or her history values is not necessarily coherent. For example, he writes that 
at the moment of writing, there are several courses of action he would like to make (be in 
Paris but visit someone, and others). But he cannot do all of those things, and he has to make 
a decision. The question of how Searle makes those decisions is precisely the extremely 
important question that Fish relinquishes. 
Conclusion: Critical Pedagogy, Beyond Poststructuralism 
As with Stanley Fish, at bottom, Hall's wager about the extra-discursive, Barker's 
discomfort with the idea of objectivity and facts, Berlin's and Lee's concerns about 
presuming that they can help their students lift the veil of false consciousness and see the 
truth, and beyond their collective reluctance to use words such as justice, freedom, and 
empowerment show that these theorists are operating from within an objectivist framework. 
When objectivity is equated with objectivism and yet there is no "'truth' of the grade" 
(Nietzsche, 1173) objectivism requires, then objective claims cannot be made and some 
alternative explanations for research and activism must be sought. But those alternative 
explanations remove the very possibility of praxis, for if oppression is merely an ideology or 
a dominant discourse and there is no way to judge the condition of oppression objectively, 
what prevents one from arguing that perhaps what the "oppressed" lack is merely a more 
naturalized dominant ideology that helps them see their oppression as, say, contentment? In 
fact what can CP be but indoctrination if peoples' (or students') understanding of their 
situation—say, their suffering—can only be ideological but not accurate? If as Lee claims, 
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poststructuralism' s "concentrating on language as discourse means attending not merely to 
the structural characteristics of language practice, but to ... material conditions" (159), then 
what does attending really mean? And what are those conditions? 
I think the objectivist framework underlying some versions of poststructuralism and 
CP reflects an inadequate appreciation of a gradual seismic shift in philosophy for the last 
hundred and fifty years. In the new landscape, knowledge and language are accompaniments 
and products of activity. In analytic philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes that "the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (1107). In continental 
philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche argued somewhat dramatically for a philosophy of life in 
which "truth [is] the illusion that helps us cope with life" (Safranski, 349). Karl Marx's 
notion of praxis—"what else is life by activity" (315) has perhaps been the best known 
example of this shift. Later views can be seen in the works of American pragmatists, and 
more recently in continental philosophy in that of Martin Heidegger for whom certain types 
of knowledge of things for humans already in the world comes from their use in activities 
(99). These views have been expounded more recently in Foucault's writings on discursive 
practices, Habermas's on communicative action, Bourdieu's theories of practical reason and 
action, John Searle's expansion of speech act theory to rationality in action (in Rationality in 
Action), the works of feminist philosophers of science such as Helen Longino, Sondra 
Harding, and Donna Haraway, and in other fields. 
As an emerging unifying theme, the concept of practice (activity, action, praxis, 
inquiry, etc.) is riddled with problems. But it has the distinct advantage of clarifying a few 
paralyzing confusions introduced by logical positivism and some versions of 
poststructuralism. Because pragmatism is the school of thought most closely associated with 
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this unifying concept, I will present my understanding of the goals and underlying 
assumptions of CP in terms of Dewey's pragmatism. 
In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey argues that organisms and their environment 
are always in a state of flux. In order to maintain life, organisms seek equilibrium when they 
come out of balance with their environment, say, when they are hungry. Through searching 
organisms form a store of knowledge, in some organisms in the form of useful habits and in 
the human organism also in the form of a store of memories (23-41) and the use of language, 
which has come about through communication in communal activities. Dewey calls the 
activity through which knowledge is gained inquiry. In How We Think, he identifies five 
steps to inquiry "(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible 
solutions; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further 
observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of 
belief or disbelief' (72-76). 
Several features of inquiry relate to CP and bear mentioning. Of central importance to 
thinkers who use activity as a unifying theme is the issue of problematization. The beginning 
point of inquiry is the problem, which arises from already on-going activities. Understanding 
the problem embeds an understanding of the activity one is engaged in. The problem also 
gives direction to inquiry. Some features of the world and certain activities become relevant 
under a certain description. A soldier may see the same person as an enemy, a child as a 
father, etc. Finally there is a close mutual interconnection between the formulation of the 
problem and subsequent activity including theory formation. Without this mutual adaptation 
of the problem and subsequent activity, theories of inquiry, praxis, etc. can easily be 
understood as variations of instrumental rationality (Hickman, 78). The importance of the 
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problem can be seen in Foucault's pre-occupation with the question of problematization, in 
Freire's "problem-posing" methodology, and in CP's sensitivity to the question of 
"oppressive reality," a reality—that is, a reality under a description given a set of problems 
and ensuing activities—that does not match the student's needs and interests. This type of 
reality represents a concealment of activity: the problem being solved, the people for whom 
an issue is a problem, why it is a problem, the solutions that have been adopted, etc. Instead, 
it presents information about the world as something already discovered and explained, not 
as theories (part of the activity of inquiry), but as given, disconnected, and meaningless facts. 
But nothing in an activity theory of inquiry and praxis eliminates facts and objective 
descriptions. And the process works at the level of Davidson's prior and passing theories 
(480) or at the level of "grand narratives" some postmodern theorists attack. These theories 
are confronted with an overwhelming array of theoretical problems. To the list of the 
problems of knowledge Searle mentions,111 add hierarchical patterns of communication, 
individual, community- and culture-wide prejudices of some scientists, institutional obstacles 
to free thinking, etc. To say that we cannot have knowledge because all knowledge is riddled 
with these problems is simply a restatement of objectivism. The knowledge we can have has 
these problems, but it is still knowledge. Within an activity given a set of problems, there are 
aspects of the world that stand out or light up (as Heidegger would say) for our inspection. If 
the activity is collective and language based, we can point to those aspects of the world. If 
the activity is focused (delimited in range), there can be a great degree of convergence on 
actors' perceptions and discussions of the aspects of the world that are lit up. And in fact we 
are engaged in a myriad of collective, focused activities, and there is great uniformity in the 
types of problems we encounter: providing for food, health, shelter, family, some exercise, 
the need to coordinate activities, etc. and in the types of solutions we have adopted and are 
adopting. 
Of course, there is no such a thing as oppression as an a-perspectival, eternal 
phenomenon. But, to quote Nietzsche again, an objective truth of that "grade" seems 
unnecessary. Oppression as an objective fact can be discovered in the same way that 
cheating in the activity of a game can be discovered. There are rules, there are ways of 
enforcing the rules, there are standards of judgement for interpreting the rules, people are 
selected to make judgements, roles are assigned to players, and then people play. And a lot 
of people watch. Social life is a huge activity based on a set of related problems, and a set of 
related solutions that highlight certain aspects of the world. And some people cheat, 
objectively. My family tells me that in Iran low-level medical staff routinely demand bribery 
before providing services. That's a form of objective (but not objectivist) cheating that leads 
to suffering and death. In most industrialized countries, with about 6% percent of the GDP 
all people receive medical care. In the U.S., health-care companies get a portion of the GDP 
roughly equal to 1.2 trillion dollars (or 12% of the GDP) without caring for about 40 million 
uninsured people. That's a 600 billion dollar profit obtained at the cost of unimaginable, 
preventable, objective suffering on the part of many of the 40 million uninsured. 
The point of establishing our right as CP theorists to use words like oppression, 
freedom, and empowerment is not that we should replace students' "oppressive reality" 
(Freire, 33) with our version. But clarifying this starting point will help us with our 
theoretical and practical priorities. It gives us a center of gravity so that we don't place equal 
11 See Page 108. 
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importance by, for example, focusing exclusively on applying or revising abstract theories in 
the classroom when there are objective structural patterns in the university inimical to 
everything CP stands for. Critical pedagogy is rooted in the problems of injustice and 
freedom, it is informed by a theory of praxis that recognizes people are active/inquiring 
agents. 
The structuralist and poststructuralist turn in critical pedagogy has offered some 
important insights, but by refusing to see systems of signification in a broader context of 
dynamic human activity and by focusing instead on static structures of signification it has 
attenuated important concepts like freedom, oppression, and agency. Worse, by removing 
the idea of inquiry as an activity, it has created a gap between world—here discursive 
formations—and embodied people and their non-discursive, material conditions and merely 
represents another face of objectivism. 
From the point of view of the process of inquiry, all terms refer to the problematics of 
inquiry. If inquiry is an activity, and activities are designed to accomplish certain goals in 
response to certain problems, then CP's goal of engaging students in the process of inquiry 
involves an assessment of the problems that have prompted the activity. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The history of thought in the West has come full circle; we are where we began, but 
perhaps we are wiser for having gone around the circle. The master tradition is finally being 
demoted from its position of being a comprehensive framework for science, art, politics, and 
ethics, to being one set of interesting and important ideas among others. But although the 
master tradition is being retired, the key problems of ethics and politics to which the master 
tradition represented a set of responses still confront us. We still have to make good moral 
and political decisions, to explain phenomena and to interpret signs, to communicate 
effectively with each other, to organize and divide tasks and to distribute resources fairly, etc. 
More than a hundred years ago, Nietzsche predicted the collapse of the master tradition and 
feared that the world would sink into nihilism. It is still an open question whether that fear 
was justified. But I don't think there is any reason to doubt that this collapse has created a 
great deal of distress. Given this collapse, we are still trying to understand how we form one 
set of ideas—values—which through the work of feminist thinkers among others, we are 
beginning to see in all our activities and thoughts. The recognition of this presence in 
science and rationality has been particularly disturbing to some thinkers. For example, Karl 
Popper in Open Society and Its Enemies has to admit that his belief in rationalism is based on 
an "irrational faith in reason" (231). Examining the view expressed by Popper, Robert 
Hollinger in The Dark Side of Liberalism writes, 
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Only science provides knowledge; moral judgments—basic, 
categorical, ultimate judgments—fall outside the scope of science; 
therefore they fall outside the scope of knowledge; therefore they 
are 'mere' opinions, expressions of subjective preferences or 
personal tastes. Thus, since science can neither prove nor disprove 
the claim that genocide is immoral, it is merely a matter of opinion 
that it is; and the opinion that it is not is of equal weight, is equally 
rational, and has equal moral force. (87) 
We have had to take another good look at long-dismissed theories of emotions, such 
as the theory examined by Martha Craven Nussbaum, who argues that "emotions are forms 
of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own 
control great importance for the person's own flourishing" (22). Reflecting on the memory of 
her mother's death, she writes, 
It was my thought that was receiving, and being shaken by, the 
knowledge of her death. I think that if we say anything else we lose 
the close connection between the recognition and the being shaken 
that experience gives us. The recognizing and the upheaval, we 
want to say, belong to one and the same part of me, the part with 
which I make sense of the world. (45) 
This view holds that emotions are not something separate from and in contrast to 
thoughts and ideas, but a special species of judgements, judgements about matters of 
immediate and profound concern to us as embodied agents. We are also still trying to 
appreciate the implications of—and to go beyond—the realization that our very thoughts 
seem to have a strong social character, that perhaps, as Hegel, Marx, Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and 
pragmatists think, we learn to converse in groups first and then to internalize our 
conversations into what we come to call thoughts. We are still struggling to appreciate the 
implications of idea formation as part and parcel of our activities as we go about 
encountering and solving problems in our individual and collective lives. As we come to 
grips with the presence of values in thinking and the social and activity characters of thought, 
we cannot but scrutinize a wide range of some of the most important ideas with which we 
have ordered our existence, concepts such as rationality, justice, and truth. We also have to 
scrutinize the ways in which we have organized ourselves: in nations, in representative 
democracies, in industrial societies, etc. 
The task is staggering but necessary because otherwise we literally will not know 
what we say. Like Popper, Fish, and Rorty, we may support our value and policy arguments 
by appeal to what Eagleton calls fideism, the idea that "life is based on certain beliefs which 
are immune to rational scrutiny" (55). Like some poststructuralist critical pedagogues, we 
may have to wonder aloud whether we can make objective claims to the effect that slavery 
and child-labor and -prostitution are forms of oppression and abuse. 
In the articles in this dissertation I have tackled very small aspects of this staggering 
task facing contemporary intellectuals. The first article focuses on the community 
characteristic of communication. The article argues that professional communication should 
explore how professionals arrive at their ideas, how they control who can have what types of 
ideas for what purposes, who can have oversight over their professional activities, and a host 
of other issues. In the post-9/11 world, I consider it to be of urgent importance to study how 
professional journalists, professional politicians, and professional bureaucrats arrive at their 
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ideas. In a sense, the continued functioning of democracy in our fragmented, industrial 
societies may depend on the understanding that may result from such a research project. 
The second article explores one small aspect of visual communication, which is 
becoming increasingly important in modern societies: how stereotypes about a group can be 
countered or how knowledge about a group of people can be taught through photographs 
without resorting to manipulation. It turns out that photographs do not provide a shortcut to 
this knowledge. Viewing photographs is easier than, but cannot replace, studying the 
complicated histories of Iranians and the conflicting interpretations of their culture. But 
photographs can play important functions. Photographs can serve as a powerful tool to learn 
a great deal about the ideological commitments of the people who do the stereotyping. But 
photographs can also create a crisis in the viewers' ideas about a stereotyped group. That 
crisis is an important step in the long process of inquiry that the people doing the 
stereotyping must embark on to learn about the stereotyped group. 
The issue of inquiry is taken up in the third article. Critical pedagogy is committed to 
the idea that students must embark on an activity of inquiry (praxis) that is meaningful to 
their lives; that is, for them to learn, they have to act in and to change their environment. 
Critical pedagogy argues that through this praxis, students will realize that they are in a 
dialectic relationship with their environment and that the world is not an unchanging given 
reality to which students must adapt themselves. But of course these pedagogical theories 
rest on a set of assumptions about the world, about human relations, about the goals of 
education, about the difference between knowledge and illusion, and many others. The third 
article attempts to defend against poststructuralist attacks on some of those assumptions. The 
concept of praxis, though it predates poststructuralism, is an improvement over the latter, and 
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in future articles, I intend to argue that composition studies would greatly benefit from a 
more nuanced understanding of the concepts of inquiry and praxis. 
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